Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The Narrowly Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina by Morris, Ryan C.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2004 | Issue 2 Article 13
5-1-2004
Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The
Narrowly Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in
Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina
Ryan C. Morris
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ryan C. Morris, Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The Narrowly Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in Lerner v. Fleet Bank and
Baisch v. Gallina, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 739 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2004/iss2/13
MOR-FIN 7/3/2004 2:11 PM 
 
739 
 
Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The 
Narrowly Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in 
Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina 
“The most important and most constant 
cause of dissatisfaction with all law at all 
times is to be found in the necessarily 
mechanical operation of legal rules.” 
Roscoe Pound.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of civil RICO, standing is an important and 
difficult issue. The complexity of the civil provisions of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute of the 
Organized Crime Control Act makes standing particularly 
problematic.2 One of the primary dilemmas of the RICO statute is 
the tension resulting from the treble damages provision of § 
 1. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 731 (1906). Pound acknowledges the necessity of legal rules and 
uniform application of the law but also the need to consider each case and allow for flexibility 
depending on the case at hand. Id. at 731–32. Moreover, Pound describes the divergence 
between ethics and the law, between the individual and the jurist: “The individual looks at 
cases one by one and measures them by his individual sense of right and wrong. The lawyer 
must look at cases in gross, and must measure them largely by an artificial standard.” Id. at 
733. As this Comment will show, standing in a civil RICO context should follow a case-by-
case approach and resist any mechanical exercise. 
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000) allows for civil actions, but in order to bring a civil RICO 
claim, the plaintiff must establish that she was injured by violations of § 1962, which contains 
the criminal prohibitions of the RICO provision. See id. § 1964(c). Section 1962 refers to  
§ 1961, the definition section, which in turn lists a plethora of predicate acts that one must 
establish in order to show the pattern of racketeering activity necessary to violate § 1962. Id. § 
1962. See generally Antonella M. Madonia, Comment, Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corp.: Standing to Sue Under Section 1964(c) of RICO for the Securities Fraud 
Plaintiff, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 923 (1993) (discussing the standing requirements and their 
complexities under civil RICO); Virginia G. Maurer, Holmes v. SIPC: A New Direction for 
RICO Standing?, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (1992) (same); Eric W. McNeil, Comment, 
Civil RICO Standing: Direct/Indirect Distinction Should Not Be Taken Sitting Down, 64 TUL. 
L. REV. 1239 (1990) (same); Daniel Joseph Shapiro, Note, Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation: Proximate Cause Dims the Bright-Lines of RICO Standing, 53 LA. L. 
REV. 1911 (1993) (same). 
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1964(c).3 While many litigants have a large incentive to transform 
their fraud cases, for example, into RICO suits in order to obtain 
treble damages, courts are tempted to limit the availability of the 
federal court system for just such attempts.4 In light of this friction, 
courts have long employed standing as a powerful tool to rid 
themselves of civil RICO cases.5 At the same time, federal circuit 
courts have either created standing rules that have been overturned 
as needlessly restrictive6 or have yet to set down a standard that is 
consistent and uniform with other circuits or the broad purposes of 
the RICO statute.7 Circuit courts, however, are not left afloat on 
troubled waters without any guiding light to bring them safely 
ashore.8 Even though courts have applied various standards in 
judging civil RICO standing, the Supreme Court set forth an 
appropriate three-factor approach to decide proximate cause, and 
therefore standing, under civil RICO.  
 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 4. See Michael Goldsmith & Evan S. Tilton, Proximate Cause in Civil Racketeering 
Cases: The Misplaced Role of Victim Reliance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 98–99 (2002) 
(noting the “broader judicial assault on civil RICO”); Albert A. Citro, III, Note, After Sedima: 
The Lower Courts.’ Use of Proximate Cause as a Limitation on Civil RICO, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
607, 610 & nn.14–15, 616 (1991); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 
485–86 (1985) (noting the “variety of approaches taken by the lower courts” as a reaction to 
the “proliferation of civil RICO litigation,” specifically the implementation of two novel 
standing requirements for plaintiffs). 
 5. Maurer, supra note 2, at 74 & n.12 (discussing the attempts by courts to restrict the 
availability of civil RICO, especially by the use of standing rules). The Supreme Court rejected 
the vast majority of these standing rules. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479 (rejecting the 
argument that a plaintiff must allege that the defendant be convicted of a predicate act or a 
RICO violation and also rejecting “racketeering injury” as a necessary component of standing); 
H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232 (1989) (rejecting a restrictive 
notion of “pattern” under the civil RICO statute). 
 6. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479; H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 232. 
 7. An example of the inconsistency is the current division among circuit courts in 
developing the proper proximate cause standard for standing under civil RICO. Compare, e.g., 
Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 
2003) (requiring some amount of reliance in which fraud is part of the predicate acts of 
RICO), with Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 850–51 (6th Cir. 2003) (employing 
common-law principles for proximate cause), and Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
228 F.3d 429, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (using a three-factor test to determine standing under 
proximate cause). 
 8. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“The absence of precise definitions, 
however . . . hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the law of standing.”). 
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Historically, although the Supreme Court has struck down 
several lower court attempts at fashioning standing requirements,9 
the Court, in the eyes of many other courts, has less successfully 
provided any concrete guidelines for standing under civil RICO.10 In 
1992, the Supreme Court faced a case that gave ample opportunity 
to delineate some of the details of civil RICO standing in Holmes v. 
Securities Investor Protection Corp.11 The Court, however, read a 
proximate cause element into the civil RICO statute and decided the 
case on proximate cause grounds without addressing the exact 
standing question presented.12 This decision has led the vast majority 
of courts to adopt proximate cause as the primary tool for judging 
standing under civil RICO.13 Although the Court discussed 
proximate cause at length in the Holmes decision, lower courts have 
found no general standard explicated by the Court14 and have 
subsequently employed a variety of proximate cause tests to 
determine civil RICO standing.15 Courts have principally derived 
 9. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493, 495 (rejecting the argument that a plaintiff must 
allege that the defendant be convicted of the predicate acts and also rejecting “racketeering 
injury” as a necessary component of standing); H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 232 (rejecting a 
restrictive notion of “pattern” under the civil RICO statute). 
 10. Civil RICO standing, then, may be considered by some as very much in line with 
the Court’s overall standing jurisprudence: “incoherent,” “permeated with sophistry,” and “a 
word game.” William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 11. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
 12. Id. at 265–69. 
 13. See Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. 
Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2002); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. 
Motor & Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2001); Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 
654–55 (11th Cir. 2001); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 14. See Madonia, supra note 2, at 960. The idea that there was no general standard set 
forth by the Court arises from the fact that circuit courts have developed a variety of different 
standards for proximate cause under RICO. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485–86 (noting the 
“variety of approaches taken by the lower courts” as a reaction to the “proliferation of civil 
RICO litigation”). To the contrary, however, the Supreme Court did provide a standard to 
decide proximate cause standing for civil RICO. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 15. See supra note 7. Compare, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & 
Co., 341 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring some amount of reliance in which fraud is 
part of the predicate acts of RICO), with Perry, 324 F.3d at 845 (employing common-law 
principles for proximate cause), and Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 228 F.3d at 443 (using a three- 
factor test to determine standing under proximate cause), and Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 
207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing a zone-of-interest test derived from Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Holmes), and Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam Inc., 79 F.3d 234, 237–
38 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), and Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 
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these tests from dicta found throughout the majority and concurring 
opinions of Holmes.16 The Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes, 
however, did provide a proper tripartite standard for determining 
proximate cause, and therefore standing, under civil RICO.17 It set 
forth three factors, none of which are rigid or per se rules, to 
determine whether a plaintiff satisfies the proximate cause 
requirement of civil RICO standing.18 This fluid approach allows 
courts to account for the limits of standing as well as the policies and 
compromises embodied in the RICO statute. 
In 2003, the Second Circuit declared its standard for standing in 
federal court under the civil provisions of the RICO statute in Lerner 
v. Fleet Bank.19 and Baisch v. Gallina.20 In both cases, the Second 
Circuit appropriately decided to rely on a proximate cause analysis as 
the primary test to determine standing under civil RICO.21 The 
court in each case focused on proximate cause and eliminated any 
zone-of-interest analysis,22 which many courts (including the district 
court in Lerner)23 have employed to decide standing under civil 
RICO.24 The Second Circuit, however, required a “direct injury that 
F.3d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). A more detailed discussion of these tests is found in 
infra Part II.E. 
 16.  See, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery, 341 F.3d 1292; Perry, 324 F.3d at 845; Newton, 207 
F.3d at 447.
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18.  See infra Part III.B; see also Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 
269–70, 273–74 (1992). 
 19. 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 532 (2003). 
 20. 346 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 21. See id. at 372–73 (“[B]ecause our RICO proximate cause analysis adequately 
incorporates the zone-of-interests test’s concerns in most cases, we have never applied that test 
independently from our RICO proximate cause analysis. We now clarify that it is inappropriate 
to apply a zone-of-interests test independent of this circuit’s proximate cause analysis.”); 
Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122 (“[T]he better approach is . . . if the standing issue may be resolved 
on proximate cause grounds . . . .”). 
 22. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373; Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122. 
 23. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 146 F. Supp. 2d 224, 231–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (determining 
standing based on a “‘zone-of-interest test,’” which is designed to determine whether “the 
plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be benefited by the provision at issue” (citing 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 287 (Scalia, J., concurring))), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 318 F.3d 113 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
 24. See Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000); Abrahams v. 
Young & Rubicam Inc., 79 F.3d 234, 237–38 (2d Cir. 1996); Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. 
v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995); see also infra notes 166–71 
and accompanying text. 
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was foreseeable,”25 which it specifically defined, coupled with a 
complete absence of any intervening causes to establish proximate 
cause and therefore standing.26 The court’s analysis rested squarely 
on a narrowly focused, mechanical test, allowing standing only to 
plaintiffs that can prove strict standards of proximity. This directness 
test flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s adoption of a more fluid 
three-factor approach for proximate cause. 
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s appropriate tripartite analysis 
for standing in Holmes, which correctly addresses the concerns of 
civil RICO, standing, and the tensions and balances between RICO’s 
broadness and standing limitations, the Second Circuit formulated a 
mechanical and categorical proximate cause test that focuses too 
narrowly on directness in order to find standing under civil RICO. 
Part II gives a brief overview of the Court’s standing doctrine and 
the background for the Second Circuit’s decisions in Lerner and 
Baisch, examining 18 U.S.C. § 1964, otherwise known as civil 
RICO, and its legislative history, as well as the Court’s principal 
decisions on civil RICO standing—Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.27 
and Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.28—and the circuit 
decisions that have followed. Part III discusses the pertinent policies 
underlying the Court’s standing analysis and how the Court’s 
decision in Holmes properly set forth a three-factor analysis for civil 
RICO standing that addresses the concerns of standing in federal 
court and the policies of RICO. Contrary to the Court’s decision in 
Holmes, the Second Circuit created a narrowly focused and 
mechanical test for directness in deciding proximate cause. 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit sub silentio rids itself of the analysis 
found in Holmes and its own decision in Commercial Cleaning 
 25. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373 (discussing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123). Other circuits have 
similarly required a “direct injury” to satisfy proximate cause. See Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
324 F.3d 845, 848–49 (6th Cir. 2003); Oki Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l 
Ass’n, 298 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2002); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor & Supply, 
Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2001). But see Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 
1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (employing a three-part analysis based on Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corp.); Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 
381 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 439 
(3d Cir. 2000) (same). 
 26. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373 (discussing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123).  
 27. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
 28. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
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Services v. Colin Service Systems, Inc.29 in favor of a standard that 
mechanistically and directly disrupts the policies and compromises 
formulated by the Court and Congress to determine civil RICO 
standing. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE BACKGROUND TO CIVIL RICO AND THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT’S DOCTRINE OF STANDING 
Standing is a complex issue that courts have not defined or 
explicated with great clarity or consistency. The Supreme Court, 
however, has provided basic premises upon which to base an analysis 
of both constitutional minimum standards for standing in court and 
judicially self-imposed restraints that limit a plaintiff’s access to 
federal court. Specifically, standing under civil RICO has had a fairly 
long and contentious history. Although written broadly to remedy a 
variety of crimes,30 the statute has given rise to a plethora of 
interesting and novel standing requirements.31 Part II.A explains 
both the constitutional and prudential elements of the Court’s 
standing doctrine. Part II.B details the statutory provisions and 
history of civil RICO, demonstrating both its broad reach and its 
complexity. Part II.C delineates some of the standing requirements 
initially constructed by courts to inhibit civil RICO suits, the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent elimination of those limits, and the 
Court’s institution of general standing requirements as decided in 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.32 Part II.D explains the Court’s 
opinion in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,33 illustrating 
the rise of the proximate cause requirement of civil RICO standing. 
Part II.E reviews some of the Second Circuit’s decisions regarding 
 29. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 381. 
 30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (“The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to 
effectuate its remedial purposes.”); see also Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 88 (noting 
that the RICO provisions “sweep[] broadly”); Elizabeth Anne Fuerstman, Note, Trying 
(Quasi) Criminal Cases in Civil Courts: The Need for Constitutional Safeguards in Civil RICO 
Litigation, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 169, 169–70 (1991). 
 31. See generally Citro, supra note 4, at 613–16; Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 
98–99 (noting the “broader judicial assault on civil RICO”); Fuerstman, supra note 30, at 170 
(noting the “novel applications of the statute”); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485–86 (noting the 
“variety of approaches taken by the lower courts” as a reaction to the “proliferation of civil 
RICO litigation”). 
 32. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
 33. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
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civil RICO standing and its proximate cause standards leading up to 
Lerner v. Fleet Bank34 and Baisch v. Gallina.35 Part II.F provides the 
factual background to the Second Circuit’s recent cases, which 
announced the new test for proximate cause in the Second Circuit. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Standing Doctrine 
Unfortunately, the doctrine of standing espoused by the 
Supreme Court is “not . . . defined with complete consistency.”36 
Some have accused the Court’s standing analyses of being 
“incoherent,”37 “‘permeated with sophistry,’”38 “‘a word game 
played by secret rules,’”39 and “largely meaningless.”40 This may 
explain why many courts have used standing in civil RICO cases as 
an adaptable and effective tool to relieve themselves of unwanted 
suits.41 Despite the apparent negativity towards this principle, the 
Supreme Court has articulated certain standards and policies 
necessary for standing in federal court.42
In essence, standing is “whether the litigant is entitled to have 
the court decide the merits of the dispute or of [the] particular 
issues.”43 In other words, standing determines whether the “plaintiff 
has a right to judicial relief.” in the federal court system.44 The focus 
 34. 318 F.3d 113 (2003). 
 35. 346 F.3d 366 (2003). 
 36. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). 
 37. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 221. 
 38. Id. (citing 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at 
342 (2d ed. 1983)). 
 39. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 40. Id. (summarizing the Court’s doctrine as “a largely meaningless ‘litany’ recited 
before ‘the Court . . . chooses up sides and decides the case’” (citing Abram Chayes, The 
Supreme Court 1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 22–23 (1982))). 
 41. Cf. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 3531 (2d ed. 1987) (“[S]tanding doctrine is no more than a convenient tool to 
avoid uncomfortable issues or to disguise a surreptitious ruling on the merits.” (citing Valley 
Forge, 454 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
 42. A complete explication of the Court’s standing doctrine is beyond the scope of this 
Comment and therefore this discussion will necessarily exclude certain nuances of the Court’s 
doctrine. 
 43. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 44. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 229. 
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of standing is centered on the plaintiff.45—whether the particular 
litigant is “properly situated to be entitled to . . . judicial 
determination.”46 Thus, although a claim may have merit, the 
claimant may be denied access to the courts because he or she is not 
the proper party to bring such a suit.47 Although judges and scholars 
seem to suggest that the merits of a case are considered to some 
extent in determining standing,48 because the focus supposedly falls 
squarely on the plaintiff, the exact nature of the determination of the 
merits of the case in deciding standing is somewhat vague.49 The 
“standing question” is thus a mixed bag of jurisdictional and merit-
based considerations and boils down to “whether the constitutional 
or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be 
understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to 
judicial relief.”50 Part of this imprecision or vagueness surrounding 
 45. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484 (“The requirement of standing ‘focuses on the party 
seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have 
adjudicated.’” (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968))). 
 46. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at § 3531 (“The focus is on the party, not the 
claim itself. The party focused upon, moreover, is invariably the plaintiff.”); see also Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he standing inquiry requires careful judicial 
examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled 
to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.”) (emphasis added). Wright and Miller also 
note, however, that there are rare occasions in which a court’s focus turns to the defendant 
rather than the plaintiff. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at § 3531. 
 47. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at § 3531; see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 
(“[S]tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular 
conduct is illegal . . . .”). 
 48. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (“[T]he standing inquiry requires careful judicial 
examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled 
to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (explaining that 
standing “often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted”); Fletcher, supra note 
10, at 234 (discussing the standing question as a look to the merits but only “a sort of nibble 
at the apple before plaintiff takes a real bite”).  
 49. See generally Fletcher, supra note 10, at 221. Fletcher argues that instead of treating 
standing as a preliminary jurisdictional issue and as something somewhat divorced from the 
merits of the case, as the Supreme Court has done, the proper analysis for standing is 
“simply . . . a question on the merits of plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 223; see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
163 (1992). Compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) 
(discussing standing as a threshold matter before even reaching the merits of the case), with 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (discussing standing as “in no way depend[ing] on the merits” but 
nevertheless being connected to the “source of the claim asserted”). Fletcher argues that his 
admonition to view standing as a merit-based consideration is simply the recognitions of an 
emerging trend in scholarly and judicial discussions. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 223 n.18.  
 50. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
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standing rests on the fact that standing “incorporates concepts 
concededly not susceptible of precise definition.”51
The Court’s standing analysis is essentially composed of 
constitutional and prudential limits to a litigant’s access to federal 
court.52 “Constitutional standing” arises from the “case or 
controversy” requirement of Article III of the Constitution.53 The 
requirement of justiciability—“a case or controversy”—is the 
“threshold question in every federal case.”54 The need for a case or 
controversy forms the very basis of standing, and neither the Court 
nor Congress can expand or tighten the restrictions of constitutional 
standing.55 Constitutional standing is a baseline below which neither 
the Court nor Congress can go. In determining constitutional 
standing, courts look to three components: (1) the plaintiff must 
have an “injury in fact,” (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the 
defendant’s actions, and (3) “the injury will likely be redressed by a 
favorable decision” of the court.56
None of these requirements of constitutional standing is 
intended to place insurmountable obstacles in the way of the 
claimant. Rather, the requirements ensure that there is a proper case 
before the court. The “injury in fact” component simply requires 
 51. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 750–51; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Warth, 
422 U.S. at 498). 
 53. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162; Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). 
Article III provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies 
between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 54. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
 55. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that “the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” are these constitutional limits); Bennett, 520 
U.S. at 162 (“[U]nlike their constitutional counterparts, [prudential limits] can be modified or 
abrogated by Congress.”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (noting that even if Congress changes 
prudential requirements, constitutional requirements remain). 
 56. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 
at 471–72 (1982) (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976))). 
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that the plaintiff have “an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual and 
imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”57 Likewise, the 
second prong, requiring that the injury be fairly traceable, asks 
whether there is a “causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of” and not merely a complaint resulting from 
“the independent action of some third party not before the court.”58 
Lastly, “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that 
the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”59 Ultimately, 
constitutional standing creates the minimum standard for a case 
(and, more to the point, a plaintiff) to enter into federal court. 
Unlike constitutionally imposed minimum requirements, 
prudential limitations rest upon “the proper—and properly limited—
role of the courts in a democratic society.”60 The prudential limits of 
standing are “judicially self-imposed,”61 although the policies and 
concerns underlying them deal essentially with the separation of 
powers between an “anti-majoritarian federal judiciary” and a 
properly elected legislative body.62 Through a variety of prudential 
standing limits, courts eliminate or restrict various potential 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may be denied access to federal court if they 
simply base their claim on “raising another person’s legal rights.”63 
Thus, plaintiffs are required to “assert [their] own legal rights and 
interests, and cannot rest [their] claims” on injuries to another.64 
 57. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 560–61. 
 59. Id. at 561. 
 60. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 498); see also infra notes 208–
13 and accompanying text. 
 61. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining that “some . . . elements [of standing] express 
merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government”); Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 62. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222. One of the central concerns governing standing is 
that an unelected judiciary may begin to assume the role of a superlegislature, creating laws 
and imposing its will in a domain more properly delegated to the legislature. Id. (citing A. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
(1962)); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). If courts began to hear cases 
without regard to the propriety of the case, then the courts may become a superlawmaking 
body and, more importantly, one without the normal democratic check. 
 63. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for 
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982)). 
 64. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. 
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This requirement, in some ways, echoes the minimum requirements 
of constitutional standing.65 Also, courts generally exclude plaintiffs 
who attempt to adjudicate “generalized grievances more 
appropriately addressed [by] representative branches.”66 For 
example, harms or injuries that are “shared in substantially equal 
measure by all or a large class of citizens . . . do[] not warrant 
exercise of jurisdiction.”67 Courts have additionally required, in some 
contexts, “that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the law invoked” in order to satisfy prudential 
standing.68 This generally means that in order to have standing, the 
plaintiff, or the harm suffered by the plaintiff, must come within the 
class of persons or injuries Congress meant to protect.69 This latter 
standing limitation typically arises in interpreting the standing criteria 
of statutes.70
Unlike constitutional limits, however, these prudential concerns 
may “be modified or abrogated by Congress.”71 By statute, Congress 
may grant standing to a much wider class of litigants than would 
have standing based on court-imposed prudential limits alone. Of 
course, Congress cannot circumvent constitutional standing, which is 
always a baseline minimum for all cases.72 But a statute may 
effectively eliminate the prudential limits traditionally imposed by 
courts.73 The shift from considerations of the court to issues of 
 65. Id. at 498–99 (“[T]he [constitutional] standing question is whether the plaintiff has 
‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation 
of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his 
behalf.” (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))). 
 66. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474–75). 
 67. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. 
 68. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474–75). 
 69. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998); Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 161–65 (1997). 
 70. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97 (noting that the zone-of-interest test “is an issue of 
statutory standing”); see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (suggesting that the zone-of-interest test 
applies to interests “protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional 
guarantee invoked in the suit” (emphasis added)); Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222–23; Craig 
R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutional and 
Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (1994). 
 71. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 501). 
 72. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that 
constitutional standing is “the irreducible constitutional minimum”). 
 73. See infra Part III.A. 
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congressional enactment is sometimes called “statutory standing.”74 
Once Congress has enacted a statute, the focus of a court’s standing 
determination turns to considerations of which persons or interests 
the statute protects,75 or how the statutory enactment has modified 
or abrogated traditional prudential concerns.76 Ultimately, provided 
a litigant still satisfies the Article III limits placed on the judiciary, he 
or she may have standing through a congressionally granted right of 
action, even though such a litigant would have been barred by 
normal considerations, such as the bar against asserting the rights of 
others.77
B. Section 1964 and Its History 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute was 
enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.78 
In addition to the criminal prohibitions of the RICO statute,79 
Congress also provided for civil remedies,80 specifically for treble 
 74. See, e.g., Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 286–87 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the focus on whether the plaintiff falls within the class that 
the statutory provision was intended to benefit). The problem with “statutory standing” is that 
it has not been defined consistently, if at all, by courts. 
 75. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97; Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162. 
 76. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164 (examining whether the statutory provision at hand 
had modified or even eliminated the normal standard for determining standing). 
 77. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (“Congress may grant an express right 
of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”); see also 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating that constitutional standing 
is an “irreducible . . . minimum”); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 
560 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Although Congress cannot change constitutional standing 
requirements, it ‘can modify or even abrogate prudential standing requirements, thus 
extending standing to the full extent permitted by Article III.’” (citation omitted)). 
 78. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 
942 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)). 
 79. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–1963. 
 80. Id. § 1964. Section 1964 contains four provisions: subsection (a) authorizes the 
courts to employ a variety of civil remedies to effectuate the purpose or goal of the statute; 
subsection (b) authorizes the Attorney General to institute proceedings under § 1964; 
subsection (c) allows for any person to bring suit for treble damages; and subsection (d) 
delineates some of the effects of the civil remedies. “Civil RICO,” as it is typically referred to, 
is located in § 1964(c) and reads: 
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court 
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any 
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of 
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damage awards in civil suits.81 Civil RICO is both complex and 
expansive.82 Although the statute is riddled with cross references and 
complexities, the general language of civil RICO broadly provides 
standing to “any person.”83 Specifically, § 1964(c) of the RICO 
statute provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person injured in his 
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this 
chapter may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages 
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including any reasonable 
attorney’s fee.”84
Although facially broad, civil RICO standing rests on proving 
that the defendant violated the criminal RICO provisions, an 
understanding of which requires examining a complex maze of cross 
references. Section 1962 enumerates four possible RICO violations: 
first, subsection (a) prohibits any person from investing any income 
derived from a “pattern of racketeering activity” in any enterprise 
that affects interstate commerce;85 second, subsection (b) prohibits 
any person from acquiring or maintaining any interest in, or control 
of, any enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of 
securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the 
preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally 
convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall 
start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final. 
Id. § 1964(c). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 
1011–12, 1014, 1031 (1980) (noting the broadness of the RICO statute as it is meant to 
reach a variety of new and illusive crimes, while also acknowledging RICO as “one of the most 
sophisticated statutes ever enacted by Congress”). 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). The 
Court in Turkette held that “the courts are without authority to restrict the application of the 
[RICO] statute” beyond its statutory language. Id. at 587. Essentially, this means that courts 
are to read the term “person,” as with all definitions within the statute, as broad as the statute 
intends without restriction. See, e.g., Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(finding that there is no serious argument that the term “person” be restricted in any sense, 
including “requiring that the [term] ‘person’ be affiliated with ‘organized crime’”). 
 84. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). The subsection states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or 
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest, directly or 
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of 
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged 
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 
Id.; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1021. 
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racketeering activity;86 third, subsection (c) prohibits any person who 
is employed or associated with an enterprise affecting interstate 
commerce to conduct or participate in the enterprise’s affairs 
through a pattern of racketeering activity;87 and fourth, subsection 
(d) prohibits any person from conspiring to violate any of the other 
three criminal provisions.88
The general terminology and prerequisites to a civil RICO suit 
are set forth in § 1961. A “pattern of racketeering activity” is defined 
as “at least two acts of racketeering activity,” one act occurring after 
the enactment of the statute and the last act occurring no later than 
ten years after the first violation.89 “Racketeering activity” in turn is 
composed of any one of numerous, far-reaching acts defined under 
the statute, taken from the common law, or found under federal and 
state statutes.90 These “predicate acts” range from murder, 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). The subsection reads, “It shall be unlawful for any person 
through a pattern of racketeering activity [or through collection of an unlawful debt] to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” Id.; see also 
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1022. 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The subsection states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to 
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
Id.; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1022. 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any 
of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”); see also Blakey & Gettings, 
supra note 82, at 1022. 
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). 
 90. See id. § 1961(1). Subsection 1 defines “racketeering activity” as: 
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, 
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or 
listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which 
is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, 
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to 
sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 
(relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is 
felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), 
sections 891–894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1028 
(relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents), 
section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access 
devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), 
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 
1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), section 1425 (relating to the 
procurement of citizenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to 
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kidnapping, gambling, arson, and robbery to federal statutory 
prohibitions, such as passport or securities fraud.91 This list of 
the reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 (relating to 
the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers), sections 1461–1465 (relating to 
obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 
(relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the 
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering 
with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against 
a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in 
application and use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of 
passport), section 1544 (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to 
fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), sections 1581–1591 
(relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons), section 1951 (relating to 
interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to 
racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering 
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 
1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 
(relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to 
engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful 
activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the 
commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to 
sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate 
transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to 
interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2318 (relating to trafficking in 
counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or computer program 
documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual 
works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright), section 
2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and 
music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in 
goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in 
certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341–2346 (relating to 
trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421–24 (relating to white slave 
traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 
186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or 
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense 
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 (except a case under section 
157 of this title), fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, 
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a 
controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled 
Substances Act), punishable under any law of the United States, (E) any act which is 
indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, (F) any act 
which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating 
to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or 
assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 (relating to 
importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the act indictable under such section of 
such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain, or (G) any act that is 
indictable under any provision listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B). 
Id.  
 91. See id. 
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predicate crimes is sizeable and covers a wide variety of acts and far-
reaching offenses, such as mail or wire fraud, which are even more 
expansive than traditional concepts of fraud and are designed as 
catchall offenses to ensnare newly imagined forms of deception.92 
Mail fraud is generally considered “the most inclusive of the federal 
statutes, since it covers a broad range of criminal activity rooted in 
fraud.”93 Thus, although complex, civil RICO is written broadly—
liability results from any injury to business or property inflicted 
through a pattern of racketeering activity (satisfied by a wide variety 
of far-reaching acts) affecting an enterprise (which is also defined 
broadly.)94
The RICO statute, including its civil provisions, was designed as 
an expansive and sweeping tool to defeat organized crime’s 
infiltration and exploitation of American economic systems.95 The 
criminal and civil penalties were designed to deliver the “mortal blow 
against the property interests of organized crime.”96 The treble 
damages provision of civil RICO was based on similar, but not 
identical, antitrust laws, which had been successful in helping to 
deter and curb economic crimes.97 Except for slight changes, the 
broad language used in antitrust statutes and civil RICO laws is 
substantially the same, although the policies behind each and their 
intended applications differ.98 Not only are the provisions of the 
 92. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 86 (describing mail and wire fraud as “a 
‘stop-gap’ device which permits the prosecution of newly-conceived fraud until such time that 
Congress enact[s] particularized legislation to cope with the new frauds” (quoting United 
States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976))). 
 93. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1031 (citing 1 CORNELL INST. ON 
ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON RICO 120–53 (1980–1981)). 
 94. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any other union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”). 
 95. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,  
§ 901, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)); see also Fuerstman, 
supra note 30, at 169 & n.2. See generally Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1010–21. 
 96. 116 CONG. REC. 602 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1970) (statement by Sen. Hruska). 
 97. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486–88 (1985) (recounting the 
legislative history and explicit adoption of antitrust-like treble damage provisions in civil 
RICO); see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1040 (explaining that civil RICO “is 
modeled after, but is not identical to, section 4 of the Clayton Act”). 
 98. See also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1040–43 (explaining that although the 
language is borrowed and is very similar to antitrust statutes, the policies behind each counsel 
against applying the same stringent standards under antitrust standing to RICO standing). 
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (“Any person injured in his business or property by 
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RICO statute written broadly, but Congress also explicitly mandated 
that the statute be read generously: “[t]he provisions of this title 
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”99 
Some members of Congress viewed the liberal mandate, and the civil 
RICO provisions in particular, as troublesomely expansive.100 They 
understood the proposed civil RICO sections to reach far and wide, 
affecting legitimate businesses in no way associated or touched by 
organized crime.101 Despite those reservations concerning the scope 
and reach of the statute, in the end, Congress enacted a wide-
ranging law nonetheless.102
C. Early Attempts at Standing Restrictions and Sedima’s Broad 
Concept of Civil RICO Standing 
Because the plain language of § 1964 appears on its face to 
generally grant standing with little restriction—“any person injured 
in business or property”—and because civil RICO created a powerful 
temptation to transform most economically based fraud claims into 
RICO suits, courts fashioned a variety of standing requirements for 
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor . . . and shall recover 
threefold the damages . . . .”), with 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (“[A]ny person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may 
sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained . . . .”). 
 99. § 904, 84 Stat. at 947; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1032–33 
(“[The] construction of RICO is one of a generous, rather than a parsimonious reading of its 
promise of new criminal and civil remedies. The statute was drafted from the perspective of the 
victim, not the perpetrator.”). 
 100. For the dissenting views of Representative John Conyers, Jr., Representative Abner 
Mikva, and Representative William F. Ryan, on the Organized Crime Control Act, see H.R. 
REP. NO. 91-1549, at 58 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4076. These 
“dissenters” specifically felt that § 1964(c) posed great problems for legitimate businesses and 
businesspeople, as it  
provides invitation for disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent 
businessmen engaged in interstate commerce by authorizing private damage suits. A 
competitor need only raise the claim that his rival has derived gains from two games 
of poker, and, because this title prohibits even the “indirect use” of such gains—a 
provision with tremendous outreach—litigation has begun. 
Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4083. 
 101. See id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4076. 
 102. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 58 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 
4034 (“civil remedies . . . contain[] broad provisions”). See generally Blakey & Gettings, supra 
note 82, at 1014–21 (describing the legislative process of the RICO statute, including the 
detractors and the enactment of a far-reaching law despite those detractors). 
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civil RICO cases, intending to limit access to federal courts.103 Only 
apparently exacerbating the problem, the Supreme Court expanded 
civil RICO’s reach as far as its language would allow. In United 
States v. Turkette,104 the Court declared that courts “are without 
authority to restrict the application of the [civil RICO] statute” 
beyond its statutory language.105 Thus, even though enacted 
primarily to combat organized crime,106 RICO was not restricted to 
such purposes, but reached legitimate businesses and businesspeople 
as well as mobsters and organized criminal groups.107 Without the 
ability to restrict civil RICO claims to cases involving organized 
crime, courts began, intentionally or not, to create alternative 
standing requirements, many of which were based on analogous 
antitrust standing criteria,108 to limit the RICO cases on their 
dockets.109 Two of these standing requirements, created by the 
Second Circuit, included only allowing private RICO claims against 
(1) “defendants who had been convicted of criminal charges, and 
[(2)] only where there had occurred a ‘racketeering injury,’”110 
 103. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1985) (noting the 
“recent proliferation of civil RICO litigation within” the circuits and “variety of approaches 
taken by the lower courts”); see also Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 93–99; Maurer, 
supra note 2, at 79–81; McNeil, supra note 2, at 1242–55. 
 104. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
 105. Id. at 587. 
 106. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 
922, 923 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)). Congress’s declared purpose was “to 
seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in 
the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing 
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in 
organized crime.” Id.; see Fuerstman, supra note 30, at 169–70 (“[T]here has been a recent 
explosion of civil RICO litigation, and courts have become more receptive to novel 
applications of the statute. . . . This current use of civil RICO was never anticipated by 
Congress, which crafted the statute as a means of combating criminal enterprises involved in 
murder, extortion and drug-smuggling.”); cf. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1013 & 
n.15 (acknowledging that RICO targets organized crime specifically but also pointing out that 
“‘[o]rganized crime’ is a phrase with many meanings,” which do not necessarily mean only 
Mafia-type organizations but may broadly encompass a variety other types of criminal 
behavior). 
 107. See Fuerstman, supra note 30, at 169–70; Madonia, supra note 2, at 926–27. 
 108. Maurer, supra note 2, at 79–86. 
 109. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486–88 (1985); Goldsmith & 
Tilton, supra note 4, at 97–98 (noting the “artificial” restrictions imposed by the courts, such 
as “jurisdictional limitations, onerous pleading requirements, and other obstacles designed to 
curtail civil RICO litigation”). 
 110. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481 (summarizing the Second Circuit’s formulation of standing 
standards).  
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which was “an injury ‘different in kind from that occurring as a result 
of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the 
predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was 
designed to deter.’”111
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.,112 the Supreme Court 
eliminated these novel standing requirements created by the circuit 
courts and expressed the general requirement that civil RICO 
standing be read broadly. Sedima involved a Belgian company that 
entered a joint venture with another corporation, Imrex.113 Imrex 
contracted to furnish electronic components to Sedima.114 The 
agreement provided that buyers would place their orders through 
Sedima, and Imrex would then “obtain the necessary parts in [the 
United States] and ship them to Europe”; the two companies would 
split any proceeds.115 Sedima, however, alleged “that Imrex was 
presenting inflated bills, cheating [it] out of a portion of its proceeds 
by collecting for nonexistent expenses.”116 Among other things, 
Sedima filed civil RICO claims against Imrex, contending that Imrex 
violated § 1964 through the predicate acts of wire and mail fraud.117 
The district and appellate courts both found that RICO required a 
“racketeering injury.”118 Additionally, the court of appeals mandated 
that the defendant in a civil RICO action must also have been 
“criminally convicted of the predicate acts . . . or of a RICO 
violation.”119
After reviewing the broad language and legislative history of the 
private remedy provisions of RICO,120 the Court concluded that 
these two standing requirements were inconsistent with the broad 
purposes of RICO and, therefore, untenable.121 Although the Court 
recognized the “proliferation of civil RICO litigation within the 
 111. Id. at 485 (citations omitted). 
 112. Id. at 479. 
 113. Id. at 483. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 483–84. 
 116. Id. at 484. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 484–85. The “racketeering injury” was an analogy to antitrust law that 
required an “antitrust injury.” See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 
n.15 (1992). 
 119. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485. 
 120. Id. at 486–88. 
 121. Id. at 493, 495. 
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Second Circuit and in other Courts of Appeals,”122 it also 
acknowledged the fact that § 1964 was designed as a “[p]rivate 
attorney general provision[]”—“to fill [in] prosecutorial gaps.”123 
Consistent with the statute’s purpose, its language, and its enactors’ 
intent, courts are to read civil RICO standing broadly.124 
Accordingly, as the Court instructed, “if Congress’ liberal-
construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964, 
where RICO’s remedial purposes are most evident.”125
After determining the broad nature of civil RICO, the Court 
then provided the standard for private RICO standing by turning to 
the expansive language of the statute: a “plaintiff only has standing 
if . . . he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct 
constituting the violation.”126 The Court also noted a potential 
limitation, however, in that “the compensable injury necessarily is 
the harm caused by predicate acts, sufficiently related to constitute a 
pattern.”127 Keeping with the broad reach of RICO, the Supreme 
Court additionally found significant the fact that an attempt was 
made to add “RICO-like provisions to the Sherman Act.”128 
Congress abandoned this attempt, however, because antitrust-type 
laws, if adopted completely in a RICO context, “could create 
inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of . . . a private 
litigant [who] would have to contend with a body of precedent—
appropriate in a purely antitrust context—setting strict requirements 
on questions such as ‘standing to sue’ and ‘proximate cause.’”129 
Such problems are precisely “the problems Congress sought to 
avoid.”130 According to the Court, therefore, strict requirements on 
standing and proximate cause are inappropriate under civil RICO. 
 122. Id. at 485–86. 
 123. Id. at 493. 
 124. Id. at 491 n.10, 493, 496–97; see also Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922, 947 (“The provisions of this title shall be liberally 
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”). 
 125. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496; see supra note 97 and accompanying text for Congress’s 
liberal mandate. 
 126. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496. 
 127. Id. at 497; see Maurer, supra note 2, at 82–83 (noting the “potential narrowing of 
private RICO” arising from this statement). 
 128. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (citing 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969) (ABA comments on 
S. 2048)). 
 129. Id. (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969)). 
 130. Id. at 499. 
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Although Sedima provided an expansive standing analysis, the 
precise standing requirements for civil RICO suits remained a 
contentious battlefield of warring constraints. Among the issues 
raised or lingering in the wake of Sedima were whether the 
proximate cause standard under civil RICO standing required direct 
or only indirect injury,131 and whether a plaintiff must meet the 
conditions for standing under the predicate acts as well as RICO, 
especially in securities fraud actions.132 After Sedima, courts split over 
whether standing for a civil RICO action required a direct injury or 
allowed a more pervasive, indirect injury.133 Many courts chose to 
limit standing for private RICO actions by employing a direct 
proximate cause standard that required the plaintiff to have sustained 
“a direct, personal injury.”134 In other decisions, the question arose 
as to whether a plaintiff must not only satisfy the civil RICO 
standing requirements, but also the standing components of the 
predicate acts.135 This latter question principally arose in the context 
of securities fraud litigation,136 in which, under Rule 10b-5, a 
plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to gain standing to 
sue.137
 131. See Maurer, supra note 2, at 83–86; McNeil, supra note 2, at 1245–46. 
 132. See Madonia, supra note 2, at 932–33. 
 133. See Citro, supra note 4, at 623; Maurer, supra note 2, at 82–83 (noting that the 
Court’s holding in Sedima concerning “the proximate cause test arguably could result in 
recovery for both direct and indirect consequences of the defendant’s actions, particularly 
those injures that flowed from competitive losses”); McNeil, supra note 2, at 1245. Compare 
Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987), and Rand v. Anaconda-
Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 579 (1986), and 
Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[A]n indirectly injured party should 
look to the recovery of the directly injured party, not to the wrongdoer, for relief.”), and 
Warren v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 759 F.2d 542, 544–46 (6th Cir. 1985), and Levey v. 
E. Stewart Mitchell, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1030, 1034–35 (D. Md. 1984), aff’d, 762 F.2d 998 
(4th Cir. 1985), with Terre du Lac Ass’n. v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 472–73 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
 134. Crocker v. FDIC., 826 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1987); McNeil, supra note 2, at 
1248 (noting the development of direct proximate cause and its roots in the common law; also 
commenting on the improper nature of common law proximate cause analysis under civil 
RICO: “the direct injury requirement is a rule of common-law standing and not of RICO 
standing, and its use thus should be limited strictly to those cases that justify the rule”); see also 
Rand, 794 F.2d at 849; Warren, 759 F.2d at 544–46; Carter, 777 F.2d at 1176; Levey, 585 
F. Supp. at 1034–35; Roeder, 814 F.2d at 29; Terre du Lac, 772 F.2d at 472–73. 
 135. See Madonia, supra note 2, at 932–33. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) 
(adding a purchaser-seller requirement for a 10b-5 violation). Rule 10b-5 provides: 
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D. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.138  
and Civil RICO Proximate Cause Standing 
Although it granted certiorari to resolve the split concerning the 
necessity of securities fraud predicate act standing as opposed to only 
RICO standing,139 the Supreme Court decided Holmes v. Securities 
Investor Protection Corp. on proximate cause grounds and established 
proximate cause as the essential standing question for civil RICO. 
Holmes arose from a suit initiated by the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (SIPC), alleging a fraudulent conspiracy on 
the part of seventy-five defendants that led to the ruin of a 
corporation and a broker-dealer.140 Authorized by Congress,141 
SIPC, a private nonprofit corporation, was designed to aid failing 
broker-dealers in liquidating their businesses when they failed to 
meet their obligations.142 When a broker-dealer failed to satisfy her 
obligations, SIPC could obtain a decree by which it would appoint a 
trustee to liquidate a member’s business, return registered securities, 
pool remaining unregistered securities with cash, and distribute the 
pool of assets to satisfy customer claims.143 If the pool was 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). Blue Chip Stamps affirmed the requirement that to have 
standing in a 10b-5 action the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities. 421 U.S. at 
749 (upholding the rule in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), 
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)). 
 138. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
 139. Id. at 264–65. The Court in Holmes was asked to resolve the circuit split concerning 
whether standing under civil RICO required the plaintiff to satisfy the standing requirements 
of the underlying 10b-5 Rule, which required that the plaintiff be either a purchaser or seller of 
securities per Blue Chip Stamps. 
 140. Id. at 262. 
 141. See The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 
Stat. 1636 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-78lll); see also Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261. 
 142. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261. 
 143. Id. 
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inadequate, SIPC was required to “advance up to $500,000 per 
customer.”144
SIPC’s suit rested on a rather complex series of events. The basis 
for SIPC’s RICO claim alleged that  
the defendants manipulated stock of six companies by making 
unduly optimistic statements about their prospects and by 
continually selling small numbers of shares to create the appearance 
of a liquid market; that the broker-dealers bought substantial 
amounts of the stock with their own funds; that the market’s 
perception of the fraud in July 1981 sent the stock plummeting; 
and that this decline caused the broker-dealers’ financial difficulties 
resulting in their eventual liquidation and SIPC’s advance of nearly 
$13 million to cover their customers’ claims.145
The district court ruled that SIPC did not meet the purchaser-seller 
standing requirements of the predicate 10b-5 acts, lacked proximate 
cause, and therefore did not have standing to sue.146 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed, stating that there was no such limit on civil RICO 
standing and that the district court was incorrect in its proximate 
cause analysis.147 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
the sole issue of standing.148
The majority opinion in Holmes authoritatively determined that 
civil RICO’s “by reason of” language “carries a proximate-cause 
requirement within it.”149 In announcing this necessary element of a 
civil RICO action, the Court turned to the legislative history of 
RICO and specifically noted that RICO’s private remedies provisions 
were modeled on similar antitrust laws.150 In discussing the idea of 
directness in proximate cause standards under the Clayton Act, 
which the Court found applicable to the civil RICO statute, the 
Court isolated three factors: (1) the difficulty of “ascertain[ing] the 
 144. Id. at 261–62. 
 145. Id. at 262–63. 
 146. Id. at 263–64. 
 147. Id. at 264. 
 148. Id. at 264–65. The Court in Holmes was presented with two issues: (1) “whether 
SIPC had a right to sue under RICO and [(2)] whether Holmes could be held responsible for 
the actions of his co-conspirators.” Id. The Court “granted the petition on the former issue 
alone.” Id. at 265. 
 149. Id. at 265, 266 n.11, 268. The court noted the fact that “Courts of Appeals have 
overwhelmingly held that not mere factual, but proximate, causation is required.” Id. at 266 
n.11. 
 150. Id. at 267. 
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amount of a plaintiff.’s damages attributable to the violation, as 
distinct from other, independent factors”; (2) the need “to adopt 
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at 
different levels of injury from the violative acts”; and (3) the idea 
that “directly injured victims can generally be counted on to 
vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the 
problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more 
remotely.”151 The Court, in relying on these three policies, 
acknowledged that it would be “virtually impossible” to announce “a 
blackletter rule that will dictate the result in every case.”152 After 
 151. Id. at 269. 
 152. Id. at 272 n.20. In light of the Court’s standing analysis, which focuses on 
eliminating any mechanical process for finding standing, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
751 (1984), the Court’s inability to set forth a blackletter rule may be due to the undesirability 
of doing so. See infra Part III.A (discussing the case-by-case approach of the Court in 
determining standing and the associated benefits). 
The two concurring opinions in Holmes have, to some extent, given rise to many of the 
problems concerning the proximate cause standard employed by courts, as well as the creation 
of new proximate tests. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion primarily focuses on resolving 
the conflicted purchaser-seller requirements of the predicate securities action. See Holmes, 503 
U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]e should first consider the standing question 
that was decided below . . . and . . . was the only clearly articulated question on which we 
granted certiorari.”). However, she also comments on the proximate cause standard, resulting 
in somewhat misleading notions of the majority’s position on proximate cause.  
Justice O’Connor delineates the court’s proximate cause standard as limiting “the 
availability of RICO’s civil remedies to those who have suffered injury in fact.” Id. at 279 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Later, she also states the standard as limiting 
standing to one who is “injured in some meaningful sense.” Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
Although these summations accurately describe standing or proximate cause standards, they 
are not necessarily the same as those espoused by the majority opinion in Holmes. First, “injury 
in fact,” although related to standing, is one of the essential requirements necessary for 
constitutional standing—the bare minimum that one must plead in order to gain access to suit 
in federal court. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. If the test for civil RICO standing 
boils down to constitutional limits, then the causation requirement must only satisfy the fairly 
broad test of “fairly traceable.” See id. But Justice O’Connor also speaks of “meaningful 
injury,” i.e., a direct injury. Justice O’Connor seems to implicate notions of direct proximate 
cause without even addressing the policy factors discussed by the majority. This, however, 
deviates from the majority’s admonition to look to the three factors to establish proximate 
cause. See infra Part III.B (discussing the proper Holmes tripartite approach). 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which some try to fuse with the majority opinion, see 
Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000); Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., 
Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995) (looking to Holmes and 
causation but talking of zone-of-interest); see also Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 
2003) (looking at Israel Travel and Newton as a hybrid of the proximate cause of Holmes and 
zone-of-interest), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 532 (2003), provides, however, a completely distinct 
formulation of standing and proximate cause for civil RICO. Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion, contrary to the majority’s, focuses on traditional notions of “statutory standing”—
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determining the appropriately balanced proximate causation 
requirement under civil RICO standing, the Supreme Court then 
declined to address whether a plaintiff must be a purchaser-seller of 
the predicate securities act to have standing.153 Proximate cause 
resolved the case, according to the Court, and would have solved the 
previous cases that gave rise to the circuit split.154
The Holmes decision, therefore, provides the essential 
requirement of proximate cause in civil RICO standing. The 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement of proximate cause in determining 
that is, “whether the . . . nexus . . . between the harm of which [the] plaintiff complains and 
the defendant’s . . . predicate acts is of the sort that will support an action under civil RICO.” 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 286–87 (Scalia, J., concurring). Like the other two opinions, Justice 
Scalia’s discussion includes a proximate cause element for standing in federal court. See id. at 
287 (Scalia, J., concurring). Proximate cause, however, according to Justice Scalia, arises from 
traditional requirements of standing and not necessarily because RICO has language similar to 
the Clayton Act, which had been read to include proximate cause by the time RICO was 
enacted. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Therefore, the causality component for civil RICO 
standing is the common-law standard found in most other standing analyses. Id. at 287–88 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
However, in addition to the proximate cause analysis, statutory standing has the added 
requirement that the plaintiff fall within the “zone-of-interest” that the statute was designed to 
protect or benefit, a test which varies according to the underlying law. Id. at 287 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). The “zone-of-interest” requirement was set down in Association of Data 
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (noting that the 
“‘legal interest’ test . . . concerns . . . the question whether the interest sought to be protected 
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the 
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”). This zone-of-interest test is a traditional 
requirement of prudential limitation. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Like proximate 
cause, zone-of-interest is a “background practice against which Congress legislates.” Holmes, 
503 U.S. at 287. The idea that Congress legislates against this background was reaffirmed in 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (“Congress legislates against the background of 
our prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.”). Both the 
zone-of-interest and proximate cause tests, according to Justice Scalia, “vary according to the 
nature of the criminal offenses upon which those causes of action are based.” Holmes, 503 U.S. 
at 288 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, the degree of each differs according to the predicate acts, 
id. (Scalia, J., concurring), and therefore on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s 
zone-of-interest analysis is probably the best analysis for civil RICO standing, in addition to 
various other standing contexts. For many of the reasons discussed infra Part III.A–B, the 
zone-of-interest test most correctly considers the policies and compromises associated with civil 
RICO standing. In the end, however, the Holmes decision has created a set of factors for 
determining proximate cause in civil RICO standing. Unfortunately, after Holmes, the standing 
analysis for RICO has been ripped from the Court’s generally accepted approach (i.e., zone-of-
interest) and replaced by a similar approach, but one in which courts are confused and have felt 
somewhat free to fashion new and various “tests” while still claiming fidelity to Holmes. 
 153. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 275–76. 
 154. Id. at 276 (noting that “all could have been resolved on proximate-causation 
grounds”). 
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standing seems clear. Although, ultimately, the three policy 
considerations discussed in Holmes provide for the best proximate 
cause analysis in deciding civil RICO standing,155 that principle has 
been only partially apparent to lower courts. 
E. Subsequent Decisions Following Holmes 
After the Holmes decision, numerous standards for proximate 
cause under RICO’s civil remedies standing requirements arose in 
several federal courts, an occurrence that has not necessarily been 
remedied by subsequent Court precedent for standing.156 Various 
criteria cropped up in circuit court decisions, requiring reliance, 
direct injury, zone-of-interest, and, occasionally, the three-factor 
approach of Holmes. After Holmes, and specifically in fraud cases, 
some courts began to impose various standards of proximate cause in 
civil RICO cases that specifically required a showing of reliance.157 In 
these cases, courts required plaintiffs to “demonstrate that the 
defendant’s misrepresentations were relied on.”158 This requirement 
not only bypasses the “tripartite analysis” of Holmes, but also 
eliminates a “century of mail fraud jurisprudence,” which has evolved 
into a capable and powerful tool to combat new, complex forms of 
fraud and schemes to defraud that in no way rest on reliance.159 Yet 
courts have continued to employ this overrestrictive requirement. 
Other courts mandated a strict direct injury requirement to 
establish proximate cause in civil RICO cases.160 Although these 
decisions have formulated a variety of ways in which to express their 
 155. See infra Part III.B. 
 156. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163 (noting that “Congress legislates against the 
background of our prudential standing doctrine,” which includes zone of interest). In cases 
such as Bennett, the Court has announced the standards by which standing is determined. 
Unfortunately, without clear guidance on how or if civil RICO is different from those 
standards, courts are left trying to reconcile various Court pronouncements. 
 157. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 103–08. 
 158. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing County of 
Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Green Leaf 
Nursery v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 106. 
 159. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 110–11. 
 160. Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 848–49 (6th Cir. 2003); Oki 
Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 298 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor & Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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strict requirement,161 they all nonetheless have created a stringent 
directness standard, essentially holding that only the most directly 
injured plaintiffs can establish proximate cause.162 For example, in 
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner,163 the Ninth Circuit found that 
the directly injured party in a sham building sale was the “master 
tenant” and that the sublessee, which was ultimately required to pay 
a huge increase in rent, was not directly injured, even though the 
“master tenant” simply passed on the increases.164  
Still other courts followed Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
Holmes,165 instituting a zone-of-interest analysis to determine 
standing.166 Almost a combination of proximate cause and the 
 161. Perry, 324 F.3d at 848 (requiring a “direct injury”); Oki Semiconductor, 298 F.3d at 
773 (“Some ‘direct relationship’ between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct is 
necessary.”); Potomac Elec., 262 F.3d at 264 n.2 (noting that a plaintiff must demonstrate 
“that damages flowed from racketeering activity itself.”); see also Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 
7 F.3d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the requirement that “the person allegedly 
deceived by the misrepresentations must be the same party who was injured by the 
misrepresentations in order to allege sufficiently the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud”). 
 162. See, e.g., Oki Semiconductor, 298 F.3d at 771–72. In Oki, there was a conspiracy in 
which bandits robbed Oki of millions in semiconductors and then laundered the proceeds of 
selling those semiconductors through Tran, an employee of Wells Fargo. Id. at 771. Tran 
established several accounts and moved money back and forth, finally funneling money to the 
conspirators. Id. The court found Tran did not proximately cause the injury to Oki. Id. at 772. 
Rather, the robbery was the direct injury. Id. at 774. Although it is hard to argue that the 
result should be different in this case, it is easy to see that courts simply look for any easy first 
step elimination of causation, rather than to broader notions of causality or policy 
considerations, especially in light of the fact that racketeering schemes are generally more 
complicated than mere robbery. 
 163. 31 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 164. Id. at 928–29. The court found that the party that should bring suit was SRC, the 
master tenant, and that if the sublessees wished to obtain any recovery from the injury they 
should turn to SRC. Id. The court found that the sublessees depended on intervening parties 
and therefore could not recover, even though they were the major renters in the building and 
were responsible for the vast majority of the rent. Id. at 927–28. The court, in effect, created a 
per se rule out of Holmes. They focused on the Holmes statement that “a plaintiff who 
complain[s] of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the 
defendant’s acts [is] generally said to stand at too remote a distance to recover.” Id. at 929 
(alterations in original) (citing Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 
(1992)). 
 165. See supra note 152 (discussing the concurrences by Justices O’Connor and Scalia). 
 166. Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000); Isr. Travel 
Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A 
plaintiff claiming injury by the defendant’s violation of a statute must show not only that the 
defendant violated the law but also that the plaintiff is among the persons protected by the 
law.”). Although both decisions discuss zone-of-interest in analyzing standing for civil RICO, 
their precise adoption of the test is less than clear. Both seem to suggest that it may be helpful 
in understanding proximate cause, but whether they adopt zone-of-interest wholesale remains 
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traditional zone-of-interest test, this zone-of-interest requirement 
focuses on whether the plaintiff “is among the persons protected by 
the law.”167 The Second Circuit actually followed this line of 
reasoning in Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.168 The court 
found the proper test, in statutory contexts, to be whether “the 
plaintiff . . . [is] in the category the statute meant to protect, and . . . 
[whether] the harm that occurred . . . [is] the ‘mischief’ the statute 
sought to avoid.”169 Acknowledging the importance of “difference in 
terminology,”170 the Second Circuit concluded that its formulation 
of this standing test roughly equated to common-law notions of 
foreseeability in proximate cause, although under a different 
banner.171
Finally, some courts, including the Second Circuit,172 have 
employed the tripartite policy analysis of Holmes in determining 
proximate cause,173 and therefore standing, under civil RICO. These 
courts have used the “directness” approach of Holmes as the 
appropriate means to determine proximate cause for civil RICO,174 
acknowledging the variety of standards possible under the broad 
banner of proximate cause and the Court’s specific endorsement of 
the three-part analysis.175 Specifically, the Second Circuit in 
Commercial Cleaning Services v. Colin Service Systems, Inc. identified 
the three-factor approach of Holmes as the proper standard.176 In 
undetermined. See, e.g., Newton, 207 F.3d at 447 (noting the “concept of ‘zone of 
interests’ . . . can be helpful in analyzing RICO standing”). But see Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 
366, 373 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that both Israel Travel and Newton employed a zone-of-
interest test independent of proximate cause). 
 167. Isr. Travel, 61 F.3d at 1258. 
 168. 79 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 169. Id. at 237. 
 170. Id. at 237 n.3. 
 171. Id. The court discussed standing requirements in terms of causation, which the 
court then suggested equated roughly to zone-of-interest when speaking in similar terms of 
statutory standing. Id. 
 172. Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 381–85 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
 173. Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002); Allegheny 
Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443–44 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 174. See, e.g., Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 381 (“We have accordingly turned to 
those policy considerations explained in Holmes to guide any application of the Court’s direct 
relation test.” (citing Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 
F.3d 229, 239 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999))). 
 175. See id.; see also Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 272 n.20. 
 176. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 381. 
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explaining the propriety of the tripartite test, the court noted the 
impossibility of formulating a blackletter rule for standing under civil 
RICO.177 Additionally, the court found that proximate cause, as used 
by Holmes, is a generic term to describe judicial tools and that 
Holmes defined those tools.178 The court then proceeded to analyze 
standing according to the three Holmes factors.179
F. The Second Circuit.’s Decisions in Lerner v. Fleet Bank  
and Baisch v. Gallina 
In 2003, the Second Circuit altered its proximate cause standing 
test from the Commercial Cleaning Services and Holmes analysis to a 
direct and mechanical approach. In January, the court decided 
Lerner v. Fleet Bank,180 which involved the aftermath of a lawyer’s 
Ponzi scheme.181 In Lerner, a lawyer, Schick, devised a scheme in 
which he convinced people to invest with him based on his practice 
of bidding “on distressed mortgage pools” and, upon winning the 
auction, immediately reselling the pool for a quick profit.182 The 
foolproof aspect of this plan arose from a ninety-day due diligence 
period, in which he could rescind the purchase if he found no 
seller.183 In order to carry out the scheme, however, he needed a 
“deposit of substantial sums of cash as evidence of his good faith.”184 
Investors deposited money in escrow accounts, apparently “covered 
 177. See, e.g., id. (noting that “[t]he Court stressed the difficulty of achieving precision in 
fashioning a test for determining whether a plaintiff’s injury was sufficiently ‘direct’ to permit 
standing under RICO. . . . It expressly warned against applying a mechanical test . . . . We have 
accordingly turned to those policy considerations explained in Holmes to guide any application 
of the Court’s direct relation test.”). 
 178. See id. 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 381–85 (noting in section headings the “Difficulty of Determining 
Damages Attributable to the RICO Violation,” the “Difficulty of Apportioning Damages 
Among Injured Parties,” and the “Ability of Other Parties to Vindicate Aims of the Statute”). 
 180. 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 532 (2003). 
 181. Id. at 117–19. This type of scheme is named after Charles Ponzi, who was convicted 
for “fraudulent schemes he conducted in Boston” in the 1920s. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1180 (7th ed. 1999). This scheme typically involves “[m]oney from . . . new investors . . . used 
directly to repay or pay interest to old investors, usually without any operation or revenue-
producing activity other than the continual raising of new funds.” Id. 
 182. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 117. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. 
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by restrictive provisions,” for which Schick would act as fiduciary.185 
“Before the investors discovered his fraud, Schick had raided the 
accounts repeatedly and managed to steal approximately $82 
million.”186
The suit in Lerner arose when defrauded investors tried to 
recover against the banks that had held the accounts. Under New 
York law, banks were required to report dishonored checks to the 
Lawyer’s Fund for Client Protection.187 The investors alleged that 
the banks “corrupt[ed] this enterprise”—the Lawyers Fund for 
Client Protection and Attorney Discipline System—by failing to 
fulfill the reporting requirements.188 During the course of Schick’s 
scheme, he wrote several dishonored checks from the investors’ 
accounts.189 The predicate acts of wire and mail fraud arose by virtue 
of the banks’ mailing fraudulent statements concerning the 
dishonored checks.190 The plaintiffs argued that by failing to report 
the bounced and improper checks, the Attorney Discipline System 
was prevented from acting against Schick, which would have led the 
investors “to distrust Schick and discontinue their investments.”191 
The court held that the plaintiffs’ injuries were not caused by the 
RICO predicate acts but by violations of state reporting 
requirements.192 Moreover, “[t]he racketeering activities [were] not a 
substantial factor . . . . [n]or were [the plaintiffs’] losses a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of that conduct.”193 Therefore, the plaintiffs 
lacked standing. 
In October, the Second Circuit clarified its approach in Baisch v. 
Gallina,194 which involved a financier who was allegedly defrauded 
by a father-and-son construction business in league with an insurance 
 185. Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1300.1(c) (2003) (“[A] 
dishonored check report by a banking institution shall be required whenever a properly payable 
instrument is presented against an attorney special, trust or escrow account which contains 
sufficient available funds, and the banking institution dishonors the instrument for that 
reason.”). 
 186. Lerner, 318 F.3d. at 117–18. 
 187. Id. at 118. 
 188. Id. at 118–19. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 119. 
 192. Id. at 123. 
 193. Id. 
 194. 346 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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company.195 Nassau County contracted Raycon, the father-and-son 
company, to perform various construction projects.196 Nassau 
County, under its agreement, required Raycon to hire only 
employees, excluding independent contractors, for example, and 
additionally mandated that the employees be covered by workers’ 
compensation, disability, and general liability insurance.197 Moreover, 
Nassau County required that Raycon obtain performance bonds.198 
According to Baisch, the plaintiff in this case, Frank Gallina, a 
shareholder and vice president of McKinnon-Doxsee Insurance 
Agency, helped Raycon obtain insurance policies and performance 
bonds knowing that Raycon submitted inflated estimates and 
falsified claim vouchers.199
Furthermore, Baisch’s suit against Gallina rested on the claim 
that Raycon and Gallina defrauded him of nearly a half a million 
dollars. Based on Gallina’s representations, Baisch agreed to enter a 
factoring agreement with Raycon, whereby he would advance money 
to Raycon based on claim vouchers submitted to him for work done 
for Nassau.200 When Nassau County paid Raycon, Baisch was 
supposed to receive payment for money lent.201 Baisch alleged that 
Raycon submitted forty-four vouchers, which were fraudulent, and 
some of which were never submitted to Nassau County and could, 
therefore, never be repaid.202 Baisch was left, therefore, with having 
lent the money but without the possibility of repayment. The court 
held that Gallina’s “racketeering pattern of mail fraud proximately 
caused [Baisch’s] injury.”203 Furthermore, Baisch’s injury was 
reasonably foreseeable because “Baisch was a ‘target[]’ and ‘intended 
victim[]’ of the racketeering enterprise.”204
 195. Id. at 369. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 369–70. 
 201. Id. at 370. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 374. 
 204. Id. 
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III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S NEW STANDARD FOR PROXIMATE 
CAUSE: A DIRECT AND MECHANICAL REMOVAL OF THE PROPER 
TRIPARTITE APPROACH 
An analysis of the background to standing, and civil RICO 
standing specifically, provides two general conclusions. First, the 
general history of civil RICO standing illustrates the broad and 
expansive nature of RICO and specifically the broad standing 
requirements of civil RICO. Second, the standards employed by 
courts have increasingly led to a variety of tests and analyses for 
RICO standing, specifically for proximate cause. A proper 
understanding of both the Court’s doctrine of standing and the 
Court’s decision in Holmes shows that Holmes provides the proper 
approach to proximate cause and standing under civil RICO. 
Contrary to the proper Holmes analysis, however, the Second Circuit 
created a mechanical and narrowly focused test for directness in 
determining proximate cause, which tacitly disregards not only the 
Holmes approach but also the policies and tensions underlying 
standing generally and standing under civil RICO specifically.  
Part III.A discusses two primary principles for understanding 
standing, specifically as standing relates to statutory causes of action. 
These two principles are, first, the need for taking special notice of 
the tension between courts and Congress resulting from statues and, 
second, the need for careful case-by-case determinations of standing. 
Part III.B posits that the Court in Holmes appropriately accounted 
for the tensions between standing and the policies of civil RICO by 
providing for a fluid three-factor approach for determining 
proximate cause. Part III.C argues that the Second Circuit ignored 
the Court’s analysis in favor of a categorical and stringent directness 
approach to proximate cause, which ultimately disrupts the policies 
balanced by the Court and Congress in determining civil RICO 
standing. 
A. Two Principles of Standing Properly Understood 
Although the Court’s standing doctrine has been criticized for its 
vagueness and inconsistency,205 a proper understanding of the 
concerns and policies underlying standing suggests two fundamental 
considerations in understanding and analyzing standing, especially in 
 205. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
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a statutory context: (1) courts must take special notice of the tension 
statutes create between courts and Congress, and (2) standing 
generally rests on a careful case-by-case determination of the case at 
hand rather than on any mechanical exercise.  
First, standing in a statutory context requires courts to consider 
the tension statutes create between the courts’ traditional prudential 
limits and Congress’s directives. When courts judge aspects of law 
removed from congressional enactment, such as common law or 
constitutional issues, the policies of standing typically follow those 
set down as constitutional or prudential limits on courts.206 Courts 
are free to examine a variety of policies that counsel for or against 
allowing a litigant into federal court.207 As discussed previously, the 
traditional purpose of prudential standing is essentially to limit the 
role of the federal judiciary.208 Without some form of limitation, the 
federal “courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of 
wide public significance even though other governmental institutions 
may be more competent.”209 These concerns boil down to 
considerations of “truly adverse” litigants,210 “judicial restraint,”211 
ensuring that only the most directly affected parties litigate, ensuring 
that there is a “concrete case,” and “preventing the anti-majoritarian 
federal judiciary from usurping the policy-making functions of the 
popularly elected branches”212 (i.e., “deference to the legislature” 
 206. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–502 (1975). 
 207. See supra notes 60–70 and accompanying text. 
 208. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (noting that standing is 
grounded in the “idea of separation of powers” and reiterating the concern in Warth that 
standing is based in the concern over the limited role of the judiciary); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 
(finding that standing “is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of 
the courts in a democratic society”); Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222 (noting that standing is 
designed to “prevent[] the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policy-making 
functions of the popularly elected branches”); see also supra notes 60–70 and accompanying 
text. 
 209. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
 210. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1968); 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99). 
 211. Kurt S. Kusiak, Note, Standing to Sue: A Brief Review of Current Standing Doctrine, 
71 B.U. L. REV. 667, 678 (1991) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 
418 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1974)). 
 212. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222 (citing BICKEL, supra note 62); see Scalia, supra note 
62, at 881. 
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and “separation of powers”).213 However, when dealing with 
statutes, courts are faced with the fact that the traditional prudential 
limits courts place upon themselves are called into question.214
In terms of determining standing for violation of a statute, a 
court’s concern typically centers on authorizing access to federal 
courts only to those litigants that Congress intended.215 Essentially, 
the court’s role, in a statutory context, is to enforce the legislature’s 
choices and compromises without extending or restricting a statute’s 
reach.216 Some courts and commentators have called this concern 
 213. Kusiak, supra note 211, at 678 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 760, and Schlesinger, 418 
U.S. at 220–21, respectively). Although the Court’s standing jurisprudence has been criticized, 
standing is not a trivial concept in federal jurisprudence: 
Article III, which is every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial 
power of the United States as in its granting of that power, is not merely a 
troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the “merits” of a 
lawsuit which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the basic charter 
promulgated by the Framers of the Constitution at Philadelphia in 1787, a charter 
which created a general government, provided for the interaction between that 
government and the governments of the several States, and was later amended so as 
to either enhance or limit its authority with respect to both States and individuals. 
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 476 (1982). 
 214. Although prudential limitations may be called into question, it is worth noting that 
the constitutional standing limitations remain intact, as they are unalterable—they are an 
“irreducible constitutional minimum.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992). 
 215. See generally William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 263 (2001) (noting that in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 
524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Court approached its “[s]tanding analysis . . . in a manner that 
explicitly wrapped this Article III constitutional question with judicial deference to the 
statutory universe of interests and incentives created by the legislature”); id. at 274 (noting 
also that within Justice Scalia’s discussions on standing there exists the proper view that a 
“judiciary that seeks to enforce the substantive and procedural choices of the legislature, but 
avoids expanding on particular preferred statutory purposes or changing the procedural devices 
chosen, is showing fealty to the discernible legislative bargain manifest in a statute,” even 
though Justice Scalia, according to Buzbee, is not necessarily consistent with this view); see also 
Gottlieb, supra note 70, at 1077 (discussing the legal interests created by Congress and the 
Court’s deferment to Congress because of those interests). What “Congress intended” could 
fill volumes. The point, however, is that a court’s focus is taken away from issues purely dealing 
with the proper role of the judiciary and centered on issues that Congress has decided the 
courts should consider. See also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163–66 (1997) (examining 
the statutory language to determine congressional intent on standing). 
 216. Buzbee, supra note 215, at 248–49 (noting that “the ‘statutory universe’ of 
legislatively created goals, procedures, and incentives remains central to standing analysis”; also 
noting the “persistent . . . strain in standing jurisprudence that calls for a more limited and 
deferential judicial standing role [for] [l]egislative judgments about statutory goals and means 
[otherwise] refer[ed] to as ‘the statutory universe’”); see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163–66 
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statutory standing.217 Regardless of the title, a court’s duty is to 
determine whether a plaintiff has proper standing in court based on 
the congressional compromises inherent within a statute and not 
purely on traditional court-centered issues. A court’s duty in this 
respect arises from Congress’s power to alter or eliminate the 
traditional prudential grounds for limiting access to federal court.218 
Congress may decide to extend standing to any party that meets the 
core constitutional requirements or to otherwise place the 
appropriate constraint on litigants anywhere else along the spectrum 
of possible limits.219
For example, in interpreting the language of statutes, the Court 
has acknowledged the judiciary’s submission to legislative will 
concerning standing. The Court has determined that, based on the 
language of the statute authorizing citizens to sue, courts should 
look to the legislation to determine how Congress has struck the 
balance in providing for entry into court.220 In Bennett v. Spear, the 
Court compared the statute at hand with other previously 
interpreted statutes to determine how broadly or narrowly Congress 
(discussing the same principle in terms of zone-of-interest, or giving deference to the choices 
of Congress). This deference in following Congress’s admonitions specifically in standing 
comports with Justice Scalia’s views on following congressional directives generally. Justice 
Scalia has noted that  
[e]ven where a particular area is quite susceptible of clear and definite rules, we 
judges cannot create them out of whole cloth, but must find some basis for them in 
the text that Congress or the Constitution has provided. . . . The trick is to carry a 
general principle as far as it can go in substantial furtherance of the precise statutory 
or constitutional prescription. 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1989). 
 217. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of 
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1282 (1989) (discussing the rise of statutory standing 
and the zone-of-interest test in administrative law). Although the concept has been employed 
outside the administrative law framework, it has not been done with much success or 
consistency. Therefore, for purposes of this Comment, I have chosen to discuss the impact of 
statutes on traditional notions of constitutional and prudential standing. How statutory 
standing has subsumed or duplicated anything discussed in this Comment must remain for 
another day. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998). 
Statutory standing is a difficult concept because of the almost complete lack of consistency or 
treatment. Statutory standing initially arose in the context of administrative law as courts began 
to consider whether a statute creating and authorizing an administrative agency also gave 
private citizens, arguably harmed by an agency, standing to sue under that statute.  
 218. See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
 219. See id. discussing Congress’s ability to modify or abrogate prudential standing. 
 220. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165. 
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had formulated standing in that case.221 The Court examined 
language such as “any person may commence a civil suit,” which had 
“remarkable breadth,”222 in comparison with “[any person] having a 
valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected,”223 or “any 
person injured in his business or property.”224 Although each one of 
these statutes allowed standing to a broad class of litigants, the 
language of each determined, to some extent, the reach of the 
standing analysis along a spectrum of breadth or restriction.225 In 
other words, Congress’s specific authorization in these statutes 
altered the Court’s typical prudential analysis, as the Court was 
required to pay heed to the delicate balance struck by Congress 
rather than focus only on the concerns of the judiciary. 
The requirement that courts focus on congressional 
compromises and balances embodied in a statute creates a tension 
between this concern and the courts’ own prudential limits. Courts 
must evaluate the ways in which a litigant’s standing is not only 
altered by notions of judicial restraint but, more importantly, how it 
is either restricted or broadened by the statute giving rise to the 
cause of action.226 When confronted with a statute that sweeps 
broadly or may raise “abstract questions” that are best left to “other 
governmental institutions . . . more competent to address [these 
types of] questions,”227 courts face the dilemma of how best to 
utilize the prudential limits traditionally employed. The result is that 
in interpreting broadly sweeping legislation, courts may feel 
empowered with tools that restrict, albeit contrary to the legislative 
will, the intended reach of the statute. 
 221. Id. at 164–65 (“The first question . . . is whether the [statute’s] citizen-suit 
provision . . . negates the [standing] test (or, perhaps more accurately, expands the [test]).”). 
The court then considered the language of the statute to determine how broad or restricted 
standing was along a spectrum of possible standing requirements. 
 222. Id. at 164 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000)). 
 223. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g)) (alterations in original). 
 224. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c)). 
 225. Id. at 164–65 (discussing the breadth of each statutory formulation of standing in 
comparison to others and which of these formulations completely eliminated prudential 
standing so that only constitutional limits remained).  
 226. This may be one reason for Fletcher’s argument that standing be determined on the 
merits alone, without regard for traditional ideas of standing. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 
222–24. 
 227. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–502 (1975). 
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Such use of judicial standing tools to craft barriers to legislative 
action intended to remedy broad concerns is inappropriate, as courts, 
in limiting standing, alter or eliminate the purpose and delicate 
balance created by Congress.228 Because standing rests, traditionally, 
on concerns of separation of powers and antimajoritarian 
difficulties,229 courts have typically employed standing as a limit on 
access to court.230 But in circumstances in which Congress has 
specifically created standing through a statutory cause of action, the 
typical standing concerns run in the opposite direction. By 
disregarding the thrust of a statute and limiting access to the litigants 
to whom Congress intended to grant right of entry into the courts, 
courts violate the same principles of separation of powers and 
antimajoritarian difficulty as if they had allowed virtually every 
litigant imaginable into federal court. Rather than leave the decision 
with Congress, the courts answer those congressional questions and 
address those legislative concerns by effectively ignoring Congress’s 
choice. The effect of disregarding Congress is the same as if the 
court had taken license with certain powers of the legislature. 
Second, standing is intended to deny any attempt at formulating 
a “mechanical exercise”231 but rather engenders careful judicial 
examination on a case-by-case basis.232 The Court has avoided any 
blackletter rules in its standing analysis.233 The result of not laying 
down any rigid approach requires courts to consider cases one by 
one and determine, based on standing policies and in light of other 
cases, whether a litigant has standing in federal court.234 Rather than 
employing categorical limits, the Court advocates a standing doctrine 
designed to consider standing on a case-by-case basis, especially in 
 228. See Buzbee, supra note 215, at 274 (discussing Court precedent that does not 
adequately account for Congress or its enactments and therefore destroys the statutes and their 
purpose); cf. Gottlieb, supra note 70, at 1134–38 (discussing the use of unalterable 
constitutional standing limits in place of prudential limits and the harm arising from not 
respecting “Congress’s discretion to weigh countervailing considerations in its decision-making 
process”). 
 229. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 60–70 and accompanying text. 
 231. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see also Kusiak, supra note 211, at 683–
84. 
 232. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (noting that the doctrine of standing is intended to avoid 
making standing a “mechanical exercise”); see also Kusiak, supra note 211, at 683–84. 
 233. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475–76 (1982). 
 234. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
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situations wherein judicial limits stand in contrast to broadly 
sweeping legislation.235 The Court’s standing doctrine is somewhat 
vague, amorphous, and without exact definition precisely because 
the Court wishes to avoid creating a mechanical exercise that would 
detract from the careful deliberation necessary.236 This approach 
ensures that courts contemplate the important compromises between 
limiting access to federal court and congressional will, as well as the 
specific policies and concerns underlying standing. Naturally, 
Congress has the upper hand in any standing match because it may 
modify any prudential limits. Thus, a flexible approach, as advocated 
by the Court, strives for constant realignment with the congressional 
will in light of judicial limits. Both concern for the policies of RICO 
and the case-by-case check on the judiciary are present in and 
characterize the Court’s proper tripartite approach to RICO 
proximate cause standing. 
B. Holmes and the Proper Proximate Cause Standard  
for Civil RICO Standing 
Although a variety of standards for proximate cause have arisen 
in the wake of Holmes,237 a proper understanding of the Holmes 
decision reveals that the correct basis for private RICO standing 
based on proximate cause is the three-factor approach employed by 
the Court. The tripartite analysis of Holmes provides for a proximate 
cause analysis that accounts for the policies underlying civil RICO as 
well as the concern for a case-by-case determination necessary for 
standing. Even though the Supreme Court mentioned the common 
law’s influence on the Sherman Act’s, and later the Clayton Act’s, 
inclusion of proximate cause principles, the Court focused on 
something related to, but apart from, traditional common law or 
specific antitrust notions of proximate cause when espousing the 
standard necessary to assert standing under civil RICO.238
 235. See id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See supra Part II.E. 
 238. Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1992); Goldsmith & 
Tilton, supra note 4, at 101, 115–18. Although Goldsmith and Tilton argue that the three 
factors of Holmes roughly equate to common-law principles of proximate cause, they still 
conclude that the three factors are a distinct approach to balance the various concerns arising 
from civil RICO claims. Id. But see Madonia, supra note 2, at 960–61; Shapiro, supra note 2, 
at 1928 (finding that the Holmes decision endorsed common-law proximate cause generally). 
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True, the Court emphasized directness in its formulation of 
proximate cause,239 but it adopted a distinct form of directness that 
focuses on three specific, flexible policies as opposed to general or 
strict common-law notions of direct proximate cause.240 The Court 
determined that the “use of the term ‘direct’ should merely be 
understood as a reference to the proximate-cause enquiry that is 
informed by the concerns set out in the text. [The Court] do[es] not 
necessarily use it in the same sense as courts before [it] have . . . .”241 
The “concerns set out in the text” consist of three policy 
considerations. First, a court must consider what difficulties arise in 
“ascertaining the amount of a plaintiff.’s damages attributable to the 
violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors.”242 Second, 
courts must consider how they may be required to “adopt 
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at 
different levels of injury from the violative acts.”243 Third, courts 
must deal with balancing how “the general interest in deterring 
injurious conduct” is met, paying special attention to the fact that 
“directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the 
law . . . without . . . the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs 
injured more remotely.”244
Although some courts have not specifically followed these three 
factors in analyzing whether a plaintiff satisfies proximate cause, and 
therefore standing,245 the Court makes clear that its “directness” 
admonition consists of analyzing proximate cause standing based on 
the three policy factors outlined. The Court explicitly states that 
The difference between Goldsmith and Tilton and other authors is in how other authors 
conceive of the common law relating to the Holmes approach. Goldsmith and Tilton “roughly 
equate” the Holmes analysis to common law proximate cause but still consider the proper 
approach to be the tripartite factors in Holmes and not notions of proximate cause generally. 
Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 115–18. Other authors, however, see Holmes as licensing 
the use of traditional proximate cause tests generally, rather than requiring adherence to a 
balanced Holmes factor approach. Madonia, supra note 2, at 960; Shapiro, supra note 2, at 
1928. 
 239. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (asserting that proximate cause carries “a demand for some 
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged”). 
 240. Id. at 269; see supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
 241. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.20 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State 
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983)). 
 242. Id. at 269. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 269–70. 
 245. See supra Part II.E. 
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“direct,” as it uses the word, means specifically those factors laid out 
in the majority opinion and not general notions of directness.246 
Thus, the proximate cause approach in Holmes does not arise from 
any prior notion of causation’s scope or reach; rather, it comes from 
the Court’s discussion of these factors.247 Essentially, the Court gives 
the old name of proximate cause to its new policy approach in civil 
RICO cases. This fact is evidenced by the Court’s own analysis, 
which walks step by step through the three-part examination to 
determine whether SIPC satisfied the proximate cause element 
necessary to have standing under civil RICO.248 The Supreme Court 
ultimately found that it did not.249 The Court determined that if 
SIPC were allowed to sue, the courts would first need to investigate 
“the extent to which their inability to collect from the broker-dealers 
was the result of the alleged conspiracy to manipulate” and not some 
other unrelated occurrence, such as the broker-dealers’ own “poor 
business practices.”250 Second, the courts would then be required to 
“find some way to apportion the possible respective recoveries” by 
both the dealers and customers, each of whom may be entitled to 
the threefold recovery of civil RICO.251 Third, “the law would be 
shouldering these difficulties despite the fact that those directly 
injured, the broker-dealers, could be counted on to bring suit for the 
law’s vindication.”252 Thus, even though the Court speaks of 
proximate directness in standing causality, it has its own formulation 
consisting of a three-factor policy consideration. 
In light of the Court’s attempt to formulate a standing doctrine 
that adequately balances the concerns of restricting access to the 
judiciary and allowing for the full impact of a broad statute,253 the 
Court’s formulation of the tripartite test adequately accounts for the 
strain between the courts and Congress. This approach does not 
force a blackletter rule on courts or overly restrict plaintiffs. Rather, 
this policy approach allows courts to balance various factors when 
deciding standing. Although the Court announced general concerns 
 246. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.20. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 272–74. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 273. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. The broker-dealers from Holmes did in fact bring suit. Id. 
 253. See supra notes 215–16, 226–36 and accompanying text. 
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over directness, such as “a plaintiff who complained of harm flowing 
merely from the misfortunes [of] a third person . . . was generally 
said to stand at too remote a distance,”254 these pronouncements 
remain mere concerns and not hard and fast rules. One factor alone 
does not require the court to exclude a plaintiff, but mandates that a 
court consider the case in accordance with RICO and its precedent. 
Of course, each of the components looks to the limits inherent in the 
judiciary, for example, whether it is equipped to make “complicated 
rules.”255 But the analysis accounts for both limitations of courts and 
Congress.  
This approach also allows for RICO’s broad purposes. The broad 
provisions of RICO256 and the Court’s precedent,257 which 
interpreted civil RICO broadly, suggest that courts should consider 
the expansive remedial nature of RICO in determining standing.258 
Although the Court emphasizes directness,259 there is no rigid or 
inflexible rule to eliminate suits.260 Rather, judges are to consider 
these elements in light of civil RICO and its purposes, including 
novel forms of fraud that may require looking past the harm done to 
immediate plaintiffs.261 This test also rests on standing’s same 
concern for case-by-case determinations, considering the policies and 
tensions underlying the law.262 Ultimately, civil RICO standing 
cannot derive from a mechanical formulation of directness but must 
rest on considerations of the Court’s three-factor approach, which 
represents an understanding of a court’s role in light of congressional 
will. 
 254. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–69 (emphasis added) (citing 1 J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF 
DAMAGES 55–56 (1882)). The court does not suggest that this is a per se rule. Rather the 
court uses the term “generally” instead of “always.” 
 255. Id. at 269. 
 256. See supra Part II.B. 
 257. See supra Part II.C. 
 258. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1040–43. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See supra notes 239–52 and accompanying text. 
 261. Cf. Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 110–12. 
 262. See Allen v. Wright, 469 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see supra notes 226–36 and 
accompanying text. 
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C. The Second Circuit’s Direct and Mechanical Disruption of the 
Proper Standing Analysis 
Contrary to general principles of standing and the flexible 
approach of Holmes,263 the Second Circuit created a direct and 
mechanical test for proximate cause in civil RICO standing. This test 
not only creates an almost categorical approach to proximate cause in 
civil RICO standing, but also narrowly focuses its attention on the 
predicate acts, making causation extremely restrictive. Although the 
Second Circuit reached different results in each case,264 the court 
declared its new direct and mechanical proximate cause analysis for 
civil RICO standing in both Lerner v. Fleet Bank.265 and Baisch v. 
Gallina.266 Following its decision in Commercial Cleaning Services v. 
Colin Service Systems, Inc.267 and the language of § 1964,268 the 
Second Circuit properly stated that a “plaintiff must plead . . . (1) 
the defendant’s violation of [§] 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiff’s 
business or property, and (3) causation of the injury by the 
defendant’s violation.”269 The first two prongs of this standing 
analysis seem to conform to the broad standing requirements under 
civil RICO.270 In discussing the third requirement, however, the 
court departed from its precedent and the proper analysis under civil 
RICO. 
1. The Second Circuit’s standard for proximate cause 
The Second Circuit’s new proximate cause analysis for standing 
takes the form of a two-part test. Both components of the test focus 
on mechanistic application of directness. “First, the plaintiff’s injury 
 263. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 264. Baish v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff did 
have standing to sue); Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 532 (2003) (finding that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue). 
 265. 318 F.3d 113 (2d. Cir. 2003). 
 266. 346 F.3d 366 (2d. Cir. 2003). 
 267. 271 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating the standing requirements as “(1) the 
defendant’s violation of § 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiff’s business or property, and (3) 
causation of the injury by the defendant’s violation”). 
 268. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970). 
 269. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 372 (citing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 120). 
 270. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason 
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue . . . .”). For a discussion of the generally 
expansive standing requirements of civil RICO, see supra Parts II.B–C, III.B. 
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must have been ‘proximately caused by a pattern of racketeering 
activity violating [18 U.S.C. §] 1962 or by individual RICO 
predicate acts.’”271 The court flatly concludes that if a plaintiff suffers 
“an injury that was indirectly . . . caused by the racketeering activity 
or RICO predicate acts,” he or she does not have standing.272 A 
litigant, therefore, who may have been injured, but not primarily, by 
a pattern or individual racketeering act has no standing to sue, even 
if the injury is sizeable. The court’s analysis of this prong centers on 
whether there was some larger intervening wrong other than a 
predicate act under RICO allegedly committed by the defendant. 
The court in Lerner determined that the primary injury arose not 
from the predicate acts, but from “violations of state reporting 
requirements.”273 Although the defendant had allegedly used the 
mails to carry out the supposed violation and it was the corruption of 
the Lawyer’s Fund enterprise that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s 
injury,274 the court focused on the reporting requirements.275 The 
court did not suggest that the plaintiffs were not injured by the 
predicate acts or that the racketeering injuries were not substantial, 
just that such injuries were not the primary injury. 
Second, even if a litigant meets the first element, he must then 
show that the injury was not too attenuated—that is, that it was a 
“direct injury that was foreseeable.”276 This component, in turn, has 
two elements: (1) the defendant’s acts must be a “substantial factor 
in the sequence of . . . causation,” and (2) the injury must be 
“reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.”277 
Additionally, the court found fit to define the exact parameters of 
foreseeability. The enumerated, satisfying elements of foreseeability 
are “the targets, competitors and intended victims.”278 Although the 
court determined that there can be more than one directly injured 
plaintiff,279 and that, generally, directness itself is a necessary element 
 271. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373 (citing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122–23). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123. 
 274. Id. at 119. 
 275. Id. at 123. 
 276. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373. 
 277. Id. at 374 (citing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123). 
 278. Id. (citing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 124). 
 279. Id. (“RICO standing extends to all directly injured parties, not just the most directly 
injured among them.”). Although the court seems to broaden its approach by allowing more 
than the most directly injured, it is important to note that the court’s standard is only slightly 
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of causation, traditional or otherwise, the Second Circuit modified 
the test into an “extraordinarily demanding test of causality.”280 The 
court employed terms and phrases typically associated with flexibility, 
or even expansiveness, such as “reasonably foreseeable,” when, in 
fact, its test is restrictive. True, foreseeability is a test designed to cut 
off liability, but it is a malleable test, generally not stringent or 
mechanical.281 Rather than employ a flexible standard, the court 
defines proximate cause, and therefore standing, outright and limits 
standing to a rather select group of potential plaintiffs. 
2. The elimination of Holmes’ flexibility in favor of categorical and 
mechanical “directness” 
The Second Circuit ultimately sets forth a fairly mechanical 
approach to proximate cause and civil RICO standing, which is 
squarely focused on directness and which flies in the face of the 
flexible Holmes approach. The first part of the “Lerner-Baisch.”282 test 
asks whether there is a larger intervening cause of the injury 
alleged.283 If there is such a cause, the court excludes the plaintiff 
from recovery. The essential problem with this component of the 
more lenient. What is even more problematic is the implication that arises from this maneuver, 
which seems almost to suggest that the court is operating on a result-oriented basis, proximate 
cause being a tool to exclude unless the judges think it should not. 
 280. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially 
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1191 (1993). 
 281. See, e.g., Michael A. Hanzman, Establishing Injury “By Reason of.” Racketeering 
Activity: A Critical Analysis of the 11th Circuit’s Per Se Detrimental Reliance Requirement and 
its Impact on RICO Class Actions, 77 FLA. B.J. 36, 41 (2003) (“Proximate cause is an elusive 
concept, one ‘always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of 
logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent.’” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 279 (5th ed. 1984))). 
 282. Admittedly, the origin of this “first prong” is questionable. The court in Lerner was 
trying to wrestle with the fact that the plaintiffs lacked any real particularized showing of 
predicate acts but instead focused on the violation of reporting requirements almost entirely. 
See Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123. The court, in order to drive the point home, found that the 
“plaintiffs principally contend that their injuries were caused by defendants’ violations of state 
reporting requirements.” Id. The court noted that “[a]t worst” this violation merely rose to 
the level of breach of contract between the banks and the “Lawyer’s Fund,” not the fulfillment 
of a predicate act under RICO. Id. The difficulty arises from the Baisch decision which 
transformed the court’s problem in Lerner into an actual prong of their proximate cause 
analysis. Rather than identify the predicate act problem as such, the Baisch court determined 
that finding another intervening cause actually fell within the proximate cause test. Baisch, 346 
F.3d at 373–74. To its credit, the court was most likely correct in finding as it did based on 
Lerner. 
 283. See supra notes 272–75 and accompanying text. 
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“test” is that it acts as a mechanical tool to remove standing. A 
defendant must simply isolate another cause of the injury in order to 
bypass any civil RICO suit. The effect of this rule is to give 
defendants engaged in complex schemes to defraud or otherwise 
commit racketeering violations a “get-out-of-treble-damages-free 
card.” The purpose of the RICO statute is, to some extent, to 
infiltrate and weed out complex schemes and plans that were 
otherwise untouchable under previously existing law enforcement 
tools.284 The result of this first prong is to blunt a new tool provided 
for the express purpose of carving out and punishing, civilly or 
criminally, new and increasingly complex forms of racketeering.285 
Instead, a defendant blessed by the winds of fate may find she is not 
liable for treble damages because the “primary” cause of a plaintiff’s 
alleged injuries was in fact a breach of contract, not the use of mails 
to carryout the fraudulent scheme planned. 
Another vexatious element of this first prong is its application. In 
Lerner, the court found that the failure to report bounced checks 
was the principal injury the plaintiffs alleged and that, therefore, the 
plaintiffs could not establish proximate cause.286 In Baisch, the court 
determined that Baisch’s suit against Gallina was valid even though 
one could argue that the true, primary injury to Baisch was Rubino’s 
breach of the factoring agreement.287 The court found that “Baisch’s 
injury was directly caused by Rubino’s fraudulent factoring 
agreement,” and that because Gallina had a hand in inducing Baisch 
to enter into the agreement, there was a direct link between Gallina’s 
fraudulent conduct (inducing Baisch to enter an agreement with 
parties Gallina knew to be engaged in fraudulent activity) and the 
harm resulting from the fraud.288
In both cases, the defendant allegedly committed some form of 
fraud in the transaction between the parties.289 In Lerner, the banks 
 284. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
 285. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1013; supra notes 95–102 and 
accompanying text. 
 286. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123. 
 287. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 374. The district court in fact found precisely that the direct 
injury was the factoring agreement, which cut off liability to Gallina. The plaintiffs, therefore, 
had no standing against Gallina. 
 288. Id. at 374, 376–77. 
 289. Both cases involved mail or wire fraud as the predicate act. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 119 
(“Plaintiffs . . . allege that defendants committed several predicate acts of mail and wire 
fraud . . . by: stamping dishonored checks ‘refer to maker’ rather than ‘insufficient funds’ and 
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allegedly committed mail fraud against the defendants directly, as 
well as against the Lawyer’s Fund, by misrepresenting Schick’s illicit 
activities.290 In Baisch, Gallina fraudulently induced Baisch to enter a 
factoring agreement partially through the use of the mails.291 
Admittedly, the connection is closer in Baisch, as Gallina allegedly 
induced Baisch to enter an agreement that ultimately became the 
source of his injury,292 whereas the banks in Lerner merely prolonged 
Schick’s activities through their alleged fraud.293 The sticky point, 
however, rests on the cause of the injury: an allegedly third, more 
primary injury. The injury in both cases arose principally from a 
third-party violation. In Lerner, the harm that allegedly befell the 
plaintiffs derived from the banks’ failure to report fraudulent checks, 
which prolonged the plaintiffs’ injury by Schick.294 In Baisch, the 
injury came from Rubino’s ultimate breach of their factoring 
agreement.295 The difference between these two cases is obvious in 
that Baisch involved a plaintiff who was a party to the breached 
agreement.296 The point remains, however, that each case involved a 
suit not against the primary, violating party, but against the more 
removed party. Although at varying degrees, each case involves 
RICO claims that were only incidental to the real infringement. Part 
of the reason for this difference is the court’s overly narrow focus on 
the predicate acts, which is discussed in more detail below.297 
Additionally, it may have been difficult to pass up a situation that 
smacks of common-law fraud, that is, reliance on misrepresentations. 
However, the court never discusses such implications, and reliance is 
not an element of civil RICO proximate cause.298
returning bounced checks to the payees, including plaintiffs . . . mailing bank statements . . . 
that neglected to mention the dishonored checks; and reassuring some of those notified of the 
dishonored checks that the checks had been dishonored because of a computer glitch . . . .”); 
Baisch, 346 F.3d at 369–70. 
 290. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 119. 
 291. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 370–71. 
 292. Id. at 374. 
 293. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 119. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 374. 
 296. Id. 
 297. See infra notes 308–17 and accompanying text. 
 298. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 110–11; see also infra notes 318–23 and 
accompanying text.  
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The mechanistically direct nature of the Second Circuit’s 
proximate cause test is even more evident in the second prong, 
which states that the injury must be both a substantial factor and 
reasonably foreseeable in order for the plaintiff to satisfy the 
demands of proximate cause.299 On its face, this prong of the Lerner-
Baisch test seems more like the policy considerations and flexibility 
normally attributed to proximate cause.300 The idea that the cause of 
the plaintiff’s alleged injuries must be a substantial factor comports 
with traditional ideas of proximate cause.301 Additionally, in some 
respects, it appears to be similar to the first prong of the Holmes 
tripartite test, as its purpose is to focus the court’s attention on the 
primary causes of the injury.302 Although the court does not 
elaborate on the substantiality portion of this test, the test seems 
more rigid than the policy concerns and spectrum approach of 
Holmes. Holmes did not create a hard and fast rule303 but rather 
isolated one factor for courts to consider in determining whether a 
plaintiff should be given the opportunity to have her case heard. The 
court here invoked this standard in such a way so as to suggest that 
failure to meet it ends the inquiry. 
The more problematic aspect of this prong of the test is the 
court’s focus on “reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural 
consequence,”304 thereby eliminating a flexible standard in favor of a 
categorical rule. Standing on its own, this aspect of the court’s 
opinion appears as though it may be a mere reformulation of the 
Court’s policy considerations in Holmes.305 However, the Second 
Circuit goes far beyond reformulation and simply defines the 
 299. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123; Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373–74. 
 300. See Hanzman, supra note 281, at 41 (“Proximate cause is an elusive concept, one 
‘always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, 
common sense, justice, policy and precedent.’” (citing KEETON, supra note 281, § 42, at 
279)). 
 301. Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 115–16 (connecting the first prong of the 
Holmes factor approach with the common law requirement that “the defendant’s activities were 
a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries”). 
 302. Id. 
 303. See supra notes 257–61 and accompanying text. 
 304. See, e.g., Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373. 
 305. Because proximate cause has traditionally been viewed as a policy consideration, see 
Hanzman, supra note 281, at 41, a flexible approach to proximate cause in the civil RICO 
context may not do harm to Holmes.’ policy considerations, or at least not the type of harm 
that the Second Circuit’s strict directness inflicts. 
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necessary requisites for proximate cause under civil RICO.306 
Moreover, the court sees fit to state outright those persons who may 
bring a civil RICO suit—“reasonably foreseeable victims of a RICO 
violation are the targets, competitors and intended victims of the 
racketeering enterprise.”307 Thus, even if a plaintiff manages to satisfy 
the first prong and the first half of the second prong, she may 
nevertheless be denied standing to sue by reason of her failure to fall 
within one of these categories. Viewed differently, the court’s test 
ought to begin by determining whether the plaintiff is a “target[], 
competitor[,] or intended victim[]” of the RICO violation. If so, 
then the plaintiff must still show that not only was the defendant’s 
violation a substantial factor in causing his harm, but also that there 
was no other intervening cause that more appropriately characterizes 
the harm suffered. Compare this formulation of the proximate cause 
standard for standing under civil RICO with the broad language of  
§ 1964: “Any person injured in his business or property by reason of 
a violation of section 1962 . . . .”308 Apparently, the formulation is 
actually any person injured in his business or property except anyone 
not a target, competitor or victim, and then only if an injury is 
sufficiently focused on that plaintiff. 
In addition to being mechanically direct in theory, the Second 
Circuit’s proximate cause test is even more mechanical and restrictive 
in application by effectively limiting its proximate cause 
determination to causes arising from the predicate acts and not a 
violation of § 1962. The court’s test boils down to an overly narrow 
focus on proximate cause from the predicate acts. Initially, the 
Second Circuit uses broad language to describe its proximate cause 
test: plaintiffs must show “that their injury was proximately caused 
‘by a pattern of racketeering activity violating section 1962 or by 
individual RICO predicate acts.’”309 The court in Lerner derives this 
language from a prior case, Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, 
Inc.310 Hecht in turn relies on the broad analysis of Bankers Trust Co. 
 306. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373–74 (“[T]he reasonably foreseeable victims of a RICO 
violation are the targets, competitors, and intended victims of the racketeering enterprise.” 
(quoting Lerner, 318 F.3d at 124)). 
 307. Id. at 374; see Lerner, 318 F.3d at 120. 
 308. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). 
 309. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122–23 (citing Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 
F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 310. 897 F.2d 21 (2d. Cir. 1990); see also Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122–23. 
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v. Rhoades.311 in finding that “the injury must be caused by a 
[violation of] section 1962 or by individual RICO predicate acts.”312 
The court in Bankers Trust essentially followed the expansive lead of 
the Court in Sedima—that is, that civil RICO be read broadly and 
with “no special limitation on standing.”313 By including the 
possibility of finding proximate cause based not only on a violation 
of § 1962, but also on a violation of the individual predicate RICO 
acts, the court was, in essence, attempting to retain the expansive 
and far-sweeping impact of the civil RICO provision.314 The court 
noted that a plaintiff’s “injury is not limited to damages suffered 
from the RICO violation as a whole, but also includes injuries 
suffered from each predicate act.”315
The Second Circuit in Lerner and Baisch, however, transforms 
this broad finding into a narrow and restrictive limit on proximate 
cause in RICO standing. Rather than determine whether the 
defendant’s alleged activity, as a whole, violated a provision of  
§ 1962 that in turn proximately caused an injury to the plaintiffs, the 
court in each case chose to focus only on causation arising from the 
predicate acts.316 Rather than determine whether the defendants in 
Lerner had violated any predicate acts which in turn allowed them to 
maintain, invest, or control an enterprise, the result of which 
proximately injured the defendants, the court focused on whether 
the specific predicate acts proximately caused the injury.317 While 
explaining that the plaintiffs’ mere recitation of a chain of causation 
cannot sustain RICO standing, the court stated that “[i]n order to 
demonstrate some link between the RICO violations alleged and the 
loss of their investments, plaintiffs must show that, if the defendant 
 311. 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 312. Hecht, 897 F.2d at 23. 
 313. Bankers Trust Co., 859 F.2d at 1100. 
 314. See id.; see also supra Part II.B–C (discussing the broad sweep of the RICO statute 
and the expansive standing requirements of Sedima). 
 315. Bankers Trust Co., 859 F.2d at 1100. 
 316. This has been labeled as “convergence” causation by some attorneys. See Green Leaf 
Nursery, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003), 
petition for cert. filed, 2004 WL 114472, *18–*22 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2004) (No. 03-1050); 
Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 2003 WL 
22428715, at *11–*23 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2003) (No. 03-189). In essence, these petitioners argue 
that the courts have needlessly restricted the proximate cause test to only those plaintiffs who 
suffered the underlying predicate injury as well as the civil RICO injury. 
 317. See Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123–24. 
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banks had not committed the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud,” 
a variety of third party actions would then occur, which in turn 
would alleviate the fraud perpetrated by Schick.318 The court’s focus 
on the predicate acts as the starting point from which the “chain of 
causation” begins is far too narrow. 
The end result of this test, which focuses on the predicate acts 
for determining whether the injury was proximately caused by the 
defendant, is an overly restrictive standard. In essence, the court 
requires that the plaintiff be the person, or among the select few 
persons, duped by the fraudulent scheme in order to recover.319 
Nothing in the language of the RICO statute, however, states that 
proximate cause is determined from the predicate acts.320 In fact, one 
wonders how, in many circumstances, this test requiring that the 
predicate acts and the RICO violation be perpetrated on the same 
plaintiff operates in the case of murder.321 The statute itself creates 
no such limitation on proximate cause. Section 1964 simply states 
that “[a]ny person injured in their business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962 . . . may sue therefor.”322 And the emphasis 
in § 1962 is on investing, maintaining, or conducting an enterprise 
by virtue of the predicate acts.323 Thus, a person may be injured by 
the investment of a racketeer, who in no way perpetrated fraud on 
the plaintiff but merely used fraud or murder as a means to further or 
complete the investment which itself gave rise to the injury. Under 
the Second Circuit’s rule, however, that person may not recover. 
The result of this focus on the predicate acts as the point by which to 
judge proximate causation is that the test severely and mechanically 
limits standing to the plaintiff who can demonstrate this 
“convergence” of predicate injury and RICO injury.324
 318. Id. at 124. 
 319. See, e.g., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1994); Mylan 
Labs., Inc. v. Matikari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 320. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) states, “by reason of a violation of section 1962,” not 
necessarily the predicate acts. 
 321. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Section 1961(1)(A) lists “any act or threat involving murder” 
as a predicate act. 
 322. Id. § 1964(c) (emphasis added). 
 323. Id. § 1962; see also supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 324. See, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 
1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 2004 WL 114472, *18–*22 (U.S. Jan. 
20, 2004) (No. 03-1050); Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), petition for cert. 
filed, 2003 WL 22428715, *11–*23 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2003) (No. 03-189).  
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3. Implications of the Second Circuit test 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s proximate cause analysis is a 
needlessly limiting and mechanical test for causation and standing. A 
defendant may first eliminate the plaintiff.’s standing by attributing 
the injury to some other cause. If the other cause is significant 
enough, then the defendant is relieved of the suit. This aspect of the 
court’s test is further restricted by the court’s narrow focus on the 
predicate acts—a focus that makes the first part of the court’s test 
overly stringent, as it is extremely likely that a court may find that a 
breach of contract actually caused the injury to the plaintiff over an 
act of mail fraud, when in fact the overall harm may be attributable 
to the maintenance of or investment in an enterprise by virtue of the 
mail fraud. Even if the plaintiff passes this first barrier to standing, 
she must still show that the predicate acts themselves proximately 
caused the injury (of course, first taking into account the fact that 
the plaintiff must ultimately be a target, competitor, or intended 
victim to even entertain a suit). 
In the end, the Second Circuit’s test for proximate cause, and 
therefore standing, obliterates the Holmes standing approach which 
accounts for the policies of standing and civil RICO.325 Rather than 
follow an approach that allows for policy considerations on all sides 
and on a case-by-case basis to see whether the policies of RICO are 
upheld and the victim is made whole,326 the Second Circuit instead 
creates a test that grants standing to only a select few plaintiffs. In 
essence, the Second Circuit has created a blackletter rule for standing 
where the Supreme Court has determined none exists.327
The Second Circuit has created a test that provides no deference 
to Congress, but merely imposes the judiciary’s own policies. Rather 
than considering the compromises and the tension between the 
courts and Congress—which would account for RICO’s broad reach 
and attempt at eliminating new and novel forms of racketeering—the 
court simply creates standing requirements that allow for only a 
 325. See supra Part III.B. 
 326. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1042 (“RICO . . . is more concerned with 
compensating victims and making them whole than in maintaining a competitive economy 
where the ‘competitive acts’ are racketeering in character.”). 
 327. See supra notes 152, 245–55 and accompanying text; see also Holmes v. Secs. 
Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272 n.20 (1992) (noting that it is “virtually impossible to 
announce a blackletter rule”). 
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limited number of potential plaintiffs—a class much narrower than 
civil RICO was intended to redress. The ultimate result is that this 
test destroys the balance struck by Congress, which the courts have 
been asked to uphold.328
 Moreover, because the result of the Second Circuit’s test is so 
narrow, the court will continue to alter and modify its rule with the 
ebb and flow of new RICO cases, especially as people become more 
adept at racketeering. The problem is that the legitimacy of the court 
might be called into question. For example, in Baisch, the lower 
court found that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue based on 
Lerner’s analysis because he did not satisfy the direct injury of both 
the predicate act and the RICO violation.329 According to the court, 
the party that was harmed most directly was Nassau County, and 
Nassau County was therefore the only party that had standing.330 In 
order to find that Baisch had standing, the court was required to ease 
back on the rule in Lerner by allowing more than one “target[], 
competitor[] and intended victim[].”331 Because RICO was initially 
intended as a far-reaching and powerful tool against complex 
schemes and plans of racketeering, the Second Circuit will likely find 
that it must constantly revise and broaden its rule to find “justice.” 
The ultimate dilemma is that with such a mechanical and categorical 
rule, the perception might be that a court is making up the rules as it 
goes along. A flexible, policy-based, case-by-case approach has the 
advantage of allowing a court the leeway necessary to accommodate 
new and novel forms of fraud or racketeering while still requiring the 
court to explicate its thinking process. Any concerns that this flexible 
standard also loses its legitimacy is countered by Justice O’Connor’s 
observation that “standing concepts have gained considerable 
definition from developing case law. . . . [T]he standing question can 
be answered chiefly by comparing the allegations of the particular 
complaint to those made in prior standing cases.”332 The precedential 
quality of a case-by-case policy approach is sufficiently grounded for 
legitimacy but flexible enough for new situations and cases. 
 328. See supra notes 215–30, 253–62 and accompanying text. 
 329. Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 371 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 330. Id. (“Nassau County, not Baisch, was the target of the racketeering enterprise.”). 
 331. Id. at 374. 
 332. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751–52 (1984). 
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The Second Circuit’s standard, in the end, is one in which the 
court focuses exclusively on the limits associated with standing in 
federal court, rather than the balance between court and Congress. 
The court seems to dwell on the concerns and problems surrounding 
allowing access to federal court.333 But the court’s adherence to the 
limits placed on standing flies in the face of the purpose of standing, 
which attempts to balance the choices and compromises of the 
legislature and their impact on the courts.334 The court would 
seemingly rather mow through fields of litigants with a plow than 
selectively pick the ripe and proper plaintiffs it was sent to find. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s standing doctrine, although at times inconsistent, 
sets forth the various principles necessary to enter federal court. The 
civil provisions of the RICO statute formulated a rather broad 
standard for allowing plaintiffs to redress their potential racketeering 
claims. The Court, in interpreting civil RICO, followed the 
congressional mandate to allow for a wide class of litigants. This 
concern for the policies and compromises embodied by RICO is 
reflected in the Court’s tripartite policy approach to civil RICO 
proximate cause. Contrary to the policies underlying standing and 
specifically civil RICO standing, however, the Second Circuit 
disregarded the Holmes approach and even its own precedent in 
Commercial Cleaning Services v. Colin Service Systems, Inc. Instead, 
the court moved toward a mechanical, direct test for proximate 
cause—a test that pays no heed to the delicate balance necessary to 
weigh the concerns between court and Congress—and pays no 
homage to the proper standards announced before it. Although the 
outcome may have been the same in either case, the Second Circuit 
should still have applied the three-factor proximate cause test of 
Holmes. 
Ryan C. Morris.335
 333. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra notes 215–16, 226–36 and accompanying text. 
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